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Introduction 
 
The purpose of this research project is to analyze the relationship between the socio 
demographic characteristics of directors and the quality of Corporate Social 
Responsibility Communication in terms of content, tools and the amount of information 
transmitted. 
To reach this objective we collected data from 87 companies belonging to different 
countries and different industries listed on H&H WebRanking 2014. Through a Content 
Analysis we investigated which types of information are highlighted in reports 
downloaded by corporate websites. Grounded on Legitimacy Theory and Upper 
Echelon Theory we examined how the socio demographic characteristics of directors 
make some items more stressed than others. The Upper Echelon perspective offers a 
theoretical framework to understand how organizational outcomes are affected by 
background characteristics of directors. Due to recent corporate scandals and alarming 
reports of consumption of natural resources, increased pollution , Co2 emissions and 
multinational companies’ exploitation of child labour, the awareness and social and 
ethical commitment of society has increased and has put pressure on companies 
(Arvidsson, 2010 p.339) to engage in Corporate Social Responsibility activities and to 
communicate achievements. Therefore the importance of Corporate Social 
Responsibility  Communication derives from the need for companies to meet the 
demand of stakeholders’ non financial information in order to improve their reputation 
and gain legitimacy.  
However, the literature on Corporate Social Responsibility is not unified and the debate 
about rationales, practices and impacts on firms’ value and performances is still going 
on. In particular, while there are many contributions on the field of Corporate Social 
Responsibility, literature on Corporate Social Responsibility Communication is still 
limited. With this project we want to shed light on this controversial topic and provide  
advices to support companies to implement an efficient and effective system of 
communication. 
The script proceeds as follows. First we concentrate on a literature review about 
Corporate Social Responsibility and related disclosure; then we put attention on the 
board of directors and how it affects Corporate Social Responsibility activities and 
achievements and finally we present the research conducted underlying if the thesis 
proposed is confirmed or rejected. 
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Chapter 1. Corporate Social Responsibility 
1. Literature Review 
Despite the growing body of literature about Corporate Social Responsibility, there is 
not an universally accepted definition and generally adopted practices and measurement 
standards ( Li et al., 2010). The World Business Council for Sustainable Development 
defines Corporate Social Responsibility as “ the continuing commitment by business to 
behave ethically and contribute to economic development while improving the quality 
of life of the workforce and their families as well as of the local community and society 
at large” ( Amaladoss et al.,2013, p.66). The European Commission defines Corporate 
Social Responsibility as “a concept whereby companies integrate their social and 
environmental concerns in their business operations and in their interaction with their 
stakeholders on a voluntary basis “( Amaladoss et al.,2013, p.66).   
Corporate Social Responsibility is a contested ( Tang et al.,2015) and dynamic concept 
and many overlapping terms in this field have emerged including corporate citizenship, 
sustainable development, corporate accountability, public responsibility, corporate 
social responsiveness, business ethics and corporate responsibility ( Amaladoss et 
al.2013; Tang et al.,2015; Strand, 2013) 
Recent corporate scandals related to disproportionate management bonuses, altered 
revenues, exploitation of natural resources, injured human rights, have discredited firms 
and public opinion has raised concerns on how companies are run ( Amaladoss et al., 
2013; Arvidsson;2010) This has induced institutions (i.e. government, commissions and 
agencies), both on national and international level, to take action to prevent companies 
from unfair behavior ( Arvidsson, 2010). Therefore they have provided legal 
frameworks such as “ Code of Conduct” and “ Code of Corporate Governance” that 
companies can voluntarily adopt and international standards for certification ( e.g. ISO 
26000). Another outcome is the introduction of Dow Jones Sustainability Index, 
FTSE4GOOD Index, Ethibel Sustainability Index, ASPI and Natur-Aktien Index. All of 
them include only organizations that satisfy social responsibility requirements. 
How we can easily understand, the traditional role of companies to generate revenues 
and create value for shareholders is overcome or, even better, it has been enlarged ( 
Schemltz, 2014). Past scholars advocated that the only social responsibility companies 
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have to face is to maximize shareholders’ economic returns (Friedman, 1970; Mele, 
2008; Tang et al., 2015). However today’s academics embrace Frederick point of view 
in considering social betterment as one of organizations’ tasks ( Frederick, 2006; 
Mele,2008; Tang et al.,2015). 
Companies are social entities and they are accountable for social and environmental 
impact of their activities: they should not only make profits by providing products and 
services but they may also assure quality and safety of products, health and safety of 
workplace, improvement of their employees, respect of principles of good governance, 
disaster relief, environmental protection and community development. As a 
consequence, Corporate Social Responsibility commitment is no longer an option for 
companies but it should be integrated in day-to-day activities as a strategic driver for 
businesses ( Amaladoss et al., 2013). 
 Numerous studies based on neoclassical view have stressed negative impact of 
Corporate Social Responsibility in raising firm’s cost and putting firms in a position of 
competitive disadvantage (Friedman, 1970; Aupperle et al.,1985; Mc Williams and 
Siegel, 1997; Jensen, 2002, Cheng et al., 2014) and in bringing managerial benefits 
rather than financial benefits ( Brammer and Millingotn, 2008; Cheng et al.,2014). 
On the other hand, several empirical researchers have found out positive impacts of 
Corporate Social Responsibility on long term value ( Cheng et al.,2014) , access to 
finance( Cheng et al.,2014), financial performance ( Cheng et al.2014; Margolis and 
Walsh, 2003; Margolis et al.,2007), performance on stock markets, competitive 
advantage and strategic asset development. These studies link Corporate Social 
Responsibility to the capability of organizations to access to valuable resources ( 
Cochran and Wood, 1984; Waddock and Graves, 1997; Cheng et al.2014), attract best 
talent and higher quality employees ( Turban and Greening, 1997; Greening and 
Turban, 2000; Cheng et al.,2014) and stimulate their motivation, engage in more 
effective marketing actions ( Moskowitz, 1972; Fombrun, 1996; Cheng et al.,2014), 
take unforeseen opportunities ( Fombrun et al.,2000; Cheng et al.,2014) and gain 
legitimacy ( Hawn et al.,2011; Cheng et al.,2014).  
There is a narrow nexus between corporate governance and Corporate Social 
Responsibility, actually the first can be considered a complement to or  a dimension of 
the latter (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). There is empirical evidence that Corporate 
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Governance practices and Corporate Social Responsibility activities influence positively 
corporate financial performance; in particular Corporate Governance mediates the 
relationship between Corporate Social Responsibility and corporate financial 
performance (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013); that is, good corporate governance rules 
and practices, results in increased Corporate Social Responsibility involvement that, in 
turn, enhance corporate financial performance thanks to access to crucial resource, 
government relationship and high-skilled employees (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). 
Moreover, internal and external corporate governance and monitoring mechanisms ( 
such as board leadership, board independence, institutional ownership, analyst 
following and anti-takeover provisions) affect the intensity of Corporate Social 
Responsibility engagement leading to a positive impact on firm value measured by 
industry-adjusted Tobin’s q (Maretno and Harjoto, 2011). Firm value is more enhanced 
when directors address Corporate Social Responsibility activities within the firm to 
employee relationship, diversity and product quality instead of considering external 
pressures by community ( Maretno and Harjoto, 2011). 
 Besides better Corporate Social Responsibility performance is associated with growing 
demand for products and services, less consumer price sensitivity ( Dorfman and 
Steiner, 1954; Navarro,1988; Sen and Bhattacharya, 2001; Milgrom and Roberts,1986; 
Cheng et al.,2014), less likelihood of negative regulatory, legislative or fiscal actions ( 
Freeman, 1984; Berman et al.,1999; Hillman and Kleim, 2001; Cheng et al.,2014), 
lower idiosyncratic risk ( Lee and Faff, 2009; Cheng et al.,2014) lower cost of capital ( 
Dhaliwal et al.,2011; Cheng et al.,2014), lower cost of equity capital ( El Ghoul et 
al.,2011; Cheng et al.,2014) and lower interest rate on  capital debt ( Goss and Roberts, 
2011; Cheng et al.,2014) Superior Corporate Social Responsibility score can enable 
firms to attract socially conscious consumers ( Hillman and Kleim, 2001; Cheng et 
al.,2014) and develop their purchase intent and socially responsible investors ( 
Kapstein, 2001; Cheng et al., 2014), gather sell-side analysts’ recommendations ( 
Iannou and Serafeim; 2014; Cheng et al.,2014) and avoid financial distress ( Goss 2009; 
Cheng et al.,2014). Furthermore Corporate Social Responsibility commitment allows 
firms to develop intangible assets such as brand image, customer and employee loyalty, 
innovation, reputation and job satisfaction. In particular Cheng et al. (2014) highlighted 
that Corporate Social Responsibility can create long term value by lowering capital 
constraints ( e.g. inability to borrow and to issue equity, dependence on bank loans or 
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illiquidity of assets) that firm faces to get funds and allow them to undertake profitable 
investments otherwise forgone. This is due to several reasons. First, superior Corporate 
Social Responsibility performance leads  to superior stakeholder engagement and this 
comes down to managers’ long term orientation and less agency cost instead of short 
term orientation and opportunistic behavior and to enhancement of revenues or profit 
thanks to high quality and long lasting relationships with customers, suppliers and 
employees. Moreover companies with superior Corporate Social Responsibility 
performance disclose more about their Corporate Social Responsibility activities and in 
so doing they reduce informational asymmetries between the firm and investors and 
increase transparency and reliability of report assuring compliance with regulations. 
Finally, they  noticed that Corporate Social Responsibility performance benefits 
organizations in obtaining finance in capital markets allowing them to carry out 
profitable and strategic investments that otherwise they would not. 
Another stream of literature have put forward positive effects of Corporate Social 
Responsibility on employee attitudes, behaviors and performance by shaping their 
values and priorities. They have posit that Corporate Social Responsibility enhance 
employee performance, commitment, organizational citizenship behaviors, engagement, 
retention, identification with the organization, creative involvement, workplace 
relationships, job satisfaction, motivation and attractiveness to prospective workforce 
because employees feel to contribute to a higher purpose and they have pride in the 
organization ( Glavas and Kelly, 2014). Expanding the traditional focus of 
Organizational Justice Literature and Perceived Organizational Support, Glavas and 
Kelly (2014)  explored how  Corporate Social Responsibility can lead to a 
psychological climate of support and meaningfulness. They found that Perceived 
Corporate Social Responsibility affects positively job satisfaction and organizational 
commitment both directly and with the mediating effect of meaningfulness at work and 
perceived organizational support. Actually the perception of fairness and caring for the 
well-being of others outside the company ( i.e. Corporate Social Responsibility)  signals 
to employees that they might be treated well. In addition the perception of employees 
that they are working for a company involved in Corporate Social Responsibility 
practices and policies increase their sense of meaningfulness at work ( because they feel 
they are contributing to a greater cause) that, in turn, influences job satisfaction and 
organizational commitment. Last, they pointed out that perceived organizational support 
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mediates the relationship between  Perceived Corporate Social Responsibility and job 
satisfaction, but not organizational support ( Glavas and Kelley, 2014. P.184). 
Comparative approach to Corporate Social Responsibility have been applied to 
investigate how Corporate Social Responsibility is implemented and communicated 
across different countries in order to discover factors that affect Corporate Social 
Responsibility practices and disclosure ( Tang et al, 2015). Researches have been 
conducted at a macro-level ( i.e. political, economical, cultural and institutional drivers), 
meso-level ( i.e. industry driver ) and organizational level. 
Baughn et al ( 2007) showed political freedom and the level of governmental corruption 
as predictors of Corporate Social Responsibility practices and communication. More 
political freedom and less governmental corruption are associated to more emphasis on 
Corporate Social Responsibility values. A non-corrupted government that allows 
political freedom facilitates an environment in which firms should be responsive to 
stakeholders’ interests and demands while a corrupted government permits avoidance of 
laws, regulations and social norms. 
The level of economic development and economic freedom ( i.e. the extent to which a 
country’s economy is controlled by the market instead of the state) are other predictors 
of Corporate Social Responsibility practices and disclosure. In wealthier countries 
organizations have more resources to engage in Corporate Social Responsibility 
activities, citizens and consumers are more sensitive to Corporate Social Responsibility 
issues and the government provides rules and laws to regulate practices. Insofar, as an 
economy is controlled by the state, community development and environmental 
protection are governmental matters and go beyond the influence of corporation. 
Moreover in wealthier countries managers are inclined to satisfy  shareholders’ interests 
instead of advancing welfare of society as a whole. This is due to the presence of 
government or other institutions that deal with this issues, while in poorer countries the 
lack of government action makes managers feel responsible for community 
development. From a cultural perspective, institutional collectivism and power distance 
have been  found to be antecedents of managers’ Corporate Social Responsibility 
values. Actually, organizational values are drawn from values and beliefs of a societal - 
level culture ( Waldman et al., 2006). Institutional collectivism refers to duties and 
obligations toward the needs of community beyond personal interests. Power distance is 
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related to existing and legitimated hierarchies between superiors and subordinates that 
lead to concentration of power in the hands of few people in a culture . Empirical 
analysis showed that institutional collectivism values positively affect Corporate Social 
Responsibility. In contrast, high power distance involves less concerns about Corporate 
Social Responsibility issues. Firms in this cultural contexts may be disadvantaged in a 
global economy where stakeholders’ interests management can be strategic and 
profitable ( Waldman et al., 2006). 
Built on an institutional approach, Campbell ( 2007) explained differences in Corporate 
Social Responsibility practices and disclosure through isomorphic processes. 
Companies can adopt certain Corporate Social Responsibility practices, structures and 
frameworks to comply with laws and regulatory policies ( i.e. coercive isomorphism), or 
to be in agreement with other firms in the same industry and with the same mission ( 
mimetic isomorphism) or when influenced by professional cultures and norms ( 
normative isomorphism). Several empirical studies have confirmed these results. For 
instance, Muthuri and Gilbert (2011) found that Kenyan companies with headquarter or 
operations in other countries have different Corporate Social Responsibility approaches 
compared to domestic Kenyan firms.  
Matten and Moon pointed out  that Corporate Social Responsibility differs among 
countries because of political systems, financial systems, educational and labor systems, 
cultural systems. “Political systems” refers to the more or less active intervention of 
government/state on economic and social matters such as pensions and health. 
“Financial systems” regards the extent to which stock market is the main source of 
capital and shareholding is dispersed among investors. This occurs in United States and 
prompts to high degree of transparency and accountability, while European firms’ 
ownership is held by few investors typically banks. “Educational and labor systems” 
concentrates on the authority  left to organizations to deal with these issues. In Europe 
labor-related matters are negotiated at national or industrial level, while in United States 
sporadically there is a national-level decision making and companies develop their own 
strategies. “Cultural systems” embraces all values and strong beliefs held by members 
of a culture. Americans are characterized by philanthropy, skepticism about government 
action and reliance on ethical stewardship of companies. On the other hand, Europeans 
count on representative organizations. These institutional factors shape national 
business systems in terms of  nature of the firm, organization of market processes and 
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coordination and control systems, which in turn results in different Corporate Social 
Responsibility policies and practices. Institutional factors mold structural feature of the 
firm as the public or private nature of the ownership, discretion left to managers and 
capabilities to meet changing trends. “Organization of market processes” stands for  
how economic relations between organization are managed: they range from  long-term 
cooperation, to the presence of  intermediaries and/or business associations, to 
influences of personal relations, to market self-organization. These relationships affect 
companies ‘policies about consumer protection, product management and liability for 
production and products. “Coordination and control systems” means how corporate 
governance structures and practices are arranged particularly focusing on employees’ 
issues treatment. In Europe employment wardship is left to laws and regulations while 
in United States it’s part of Corporate Social Responsibility matters. Based on these 
differences, they have developed a conceptual framework distinguishing between 
explicit and implicit Corporate Social Responsibility. The first one is typical of liberal 
market economies as United States where individualism, discretionary agency, 
incentivizing responsive actors, liberalism, network governance, policies providing 
discretion and isolated actors are the main traits and consists of voluntary and 
discretionally policies and programs developed and implemented to take into account 
concerns perceived as being under companies’ responsibility. In contrast, implicit 
Corporate Social Responsibility is proper of coordinate market economies like Europe 
where national institutions foster collectivism, obligatory/systemic agency, 
incentivizing program-driven agency, solidarity, partnership governance, polices 
providing obligations and interlocking/associated actors. It is government/institutions 
driven and comprises requirements for corporations set in codified norms, laws and 
regulations. It results in differences in rationales behind Corporate Social Responsibility 
commitment: compliance decision in the case of implicit Corporate Social 
Responsibility opposed to a deliberate and even strategic decision in the case of explicit 
Corporate Social Responsibility. External pressures for legitimacy are considered to 
have direct implications on Corporate Governance mechanisms and, as a result,  on 
Corporate Social Responsibility choices ( Filatotchev and Nakajima, 2014). 
Scholars have also highlighted industry as a meso-level predictor of differences in 
Corporate Social Responsibility practices and communication. Industry is particularly 
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related to differences highlighted items in reports as we will talk about in the following 
sections.  
At a firm level, authors have investigated how corporate governance mechanisms affect 
managerial Corporate Social Responsibility approach through the lenses of the Agency 
Theory. Actually, Corporate Governance structures such as board independence, 
executive incentives, ownership structure and board committees and processes can 
reduce informational asymmetry between shareholders and managers and prevent the 
latter from self-interest behavior. In particular Filatotchev and Nakajima ( 2014) 
focused their attention on governance processes and posit that monitoring and control 
systems ( strategic or financial) and managerial incentives ( financial or triple bottom 
line) lead to different leadership orientation and Corporate Social Responsibility 
approach. Financial control is associated with an independent board, information 
disclosure hierarchical system and internal and external audit through financial 
performance indicators. Conversely, strategic control is less focused on short- term 
financial performance and embraces measures related to long term sustainability, 
growth in market share and stakeholder support. Triple bottom line system of 
performance evaluation integrates value creation at people, planet and profit ( i.e. it 
refers to social, economic and environmental dimensions). Strategic control and “triple 
bottom line” managerial incentives underpins stakeholder involvement in organizational 
objectives and strategy process. At the same time, governance systems are influenced 
by institutional pressures such as demands imposed by market efficiency and 
rationalized norms that legitimate governance practices. Literature have also showed 
that the nature of ownership influences Corporate Social Responsibility approach. 
Researchers have revealed that family and government-controlled organizations ( 
Filatotchev and Nakajima, 2014) and those with higher block ownership and higher 
percentage of institutional share ownership ( Maretno and Marjoto, 2011) are more 
involved in Corporate Social Responsibility programs and activities than companies 
with dispersed shareholding. Firm characteristics such as diversification, age, size, 
leverage, level of advertizing expense and profitability are also drivers of Corporate 
Social Responsibility engagement ( Maretno and Harjoto, 2011). 
Literature also counts organizational contingencies ( i.e. crisis situations, initial public 
offering, acquisition or buyout) as one of predictors of Corporate Social Responsibility 
sensitivity and commitment. For example, a company target of acquisition tends to 
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highlight financial control to improve efficiency. Besides, organizational life cycle is 
composed by multiple stages and each of them influences governance mechanisms and 
structure and, ultimately, Corporate Social Responsibility orientation ( Filatotchev and 
Nakajima, 2014). 
Scholars have called for a shifting focus of Corporate Social Responsibility 
microfoundations toward an individual level on analyses. In facts, individuals within the 
firm take decisions, implement and sustain Corporate Social Responsibility policies and 
strategies. Grounded on Strategic Management Theories, Trait theories  have found 
evidence that individual leader demographics, traits, personality, skills and abilities 
predict Corporate Social Responsibility. In contrast, behavioral theories advocate that 
Corporate Social Responsibility practices and outcomes are due to leader ‘s behaviors 
and not to their individuals differences (Christensen et al., 2014). Transformational 
leaders affect followers’ behaviors related to environmental and other socially 
responsible issues by shaping their  values, aspirations and ideals ( in this case 
Corporate Social Responsibility values) . In this way followers identify with leader, 
share his /her mission and values and are stimulated to reach goals. In particular, 
transformational leadership has been associated with higher propensities to engage in 
environmental responsibility. Other studies link Corporate Social Responsibility 
commitment to a system of checks and balances of shared leadership defined as “ an 
interactive influence process among individuals in groups for which the objective is to 
lead one another to the achievement of group or organizational goals or both” ( Pearce 
and Conger, 2003, p.1). The lack of checks and balances has been associated to 
Corporate Social Irresponsibility. 
Recently scholars have found new forms of leadership to explain Corporate Social 
Responsibility engagement: ethical leadership, responsible leadership and servant 
leadership. Ethical leaders are individuals who incite social responsibility commitment 
by “ communicating ethical standards, encouraging ethical conduct, modeling ethical 
behavior and opposing unethical conduct, making decisions that consider the needs of 
different stakeholders, encouraging support of worthy community service activities, 
encouraging improvements in product safety and recommending practices that reduce 
harmful effects for the environment “ ( Yukl, 2001, p.28). 
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Responsible leaders are generally characterized by limited economic rationales and 
enlarged stakeholder perspective, but several distinctions ( e.g. idealist, opportunity 
seeker, economist and integrator) occur to explain that different Corporate Social 
Responsibility activities depend of different responsibility orientation of leaders. 
Finally, servant leadership differs from others because its focus is explicitly on 
betterment of all organizational stakeholders ( both internal and external) and not only 
on the survival of the organization and is linked to citizenship behaviors, increased 
collaboration, job satisfaction, commitment and creativity among employees, promotion 
of morality-centered self-reflection by leaders and following helping and sales ( 
Christensen et al., 2014, p.174). Servant leadership have been related to several benefits 
on job satisfaction, team performance, Corporate Social Responsibility score,  firm 
performance measured in return on assets. Waldman et al (2006) considered  visionary 
leadership and integrity on the part of CEOs as antecedents of Corporate Social 
Responsibility values. Visionary leadership in characterized by a sense of mission, 
powerful imagery  and a sense of purpose to change the status quo, determination to 
reach aims or change. Integrity means being open and responsive to followers’ opinion, 
share information and satisfy followers’ stakes rather than his/her own. Visionary 
leadership and integrity on the part on CEO can spread Corporate Social Responsibility 
values within companies, in particular those more closely related to shareholders and 
stakeholders compared with community ones.  
We want to hook on and contribute to individual level analysis with an in dept 
investigation of socio demographic characteristics as predictors of Corporate Social 
Responsibility disclosure. 
These differences generates as many dissimilarities in rationales, themes and practices 
of Corporate Social Responsibility. According to framework by Carroll ( 1979), 
companies can engage in Corporate Social Responsibility activities to promote their 
reputation  increase both short-term and long-term returns ( i.e. economic 
responsibility), to comply with national and international legal requirements ( i.e. legal 
responsibility), to fulfill ethical conduct standards ( i.e. ethical responsibility). Other 
scholars consider motivation as a continuum between two opposites: instrumental and 
altruistic Corporate Social Responsibility. The first one is a strategic choice to enhance 
profit, while the latter is conceived to be an aid to a social well-being beyond 
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profitability and law’s  requirement. Empirical analysis have discovered that among 
Chinese and Hong Kong organization the economic rationale is the most cited, while in 
United States noneconomic rationales outweigh. Corporate Social Responsibility 
themes depends on prominence of various stakeholders’ needs. Compared to Asian 
companies, North American and European corporations tend to emphasize community 
issues through public philanthropy and environment protections and employees’ ones, 
especially fair wages and equal opportunities. Corporate Social Responsibility practices 
include donation, voluntarism, sponsorship, partnership with governments, NGOs and 
universities and  foundation ( Tang et al., 2015). Developing countries are more likely 
to direct their initiatives toward philanthropy and community development, while 
ethical, environmental and stakeholder issues prevail in developed countries ( 
Amaladoss et al., 2013).  
Despite these differences among firms, coercive isomorphism, mimetic processes and 
normative pressures are fostering standardization and institutionalization of Corporate 
Social Responsibility practices and policies beyond industries and national boundaries. 
Matten and Moon ( 2008 ) put forward that explicit Corporate Social Responsibility is 
spreading all over the world favored by global capital markets, adoption of American 
business practices and education models, crisis in political system ( especially in 
Europe) and challenges in governments’ engagement in economical and social 
activities. 
Several authors have provided implementation models of Corporate Social 
Responsibility that, even different in their conceptualization, agree in key steps of the 
process. The first stage is the assessment of organizational values and norms in order to 
identify more relevant stakeholder groups and their interests. This identification phase is 
really critical for companies because it reveals the extension of their responsibility, 
address strategies, policies and activities toward specific achievements and affect 
organizational outcomes. Then it has been proposed that companies should 
communicate Corporate Social Responsibility activities and results both internally and 
externally and monitors the responses and re-actions to evaluate whether their efforts 
are directed toward the right way ( Dobele et al., 2014). 
Mason and Simmons ( 2014)  developed a framework to embed Corporate Social 
Responsibility issues in Corporate Governance through a stakeholder management 
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approach.  In their model organizations should identify stakeholder expectation and 
determine the importance of their claims. Then companies may evaluate stakeholder 
satisfaction comparing results of strategies, processes and operation with expectations 
and using the three dimensions of organizational justice for each outcome ( distributive 
justice for the distribution of resources among the groups selected, procedural justice for 
the methods used to determine groups and interactional justice for the fair treatment of 
all group members). Finally, firms may carry out a more complex evaluation of 
Corporate Social Responsibility  impact on efficiency of implementing Corporate Social 
Responsibility principle in control and performance management systems, effectiveness 
through a cost-benefit analysis, equity as a measure of justice perceived in processes, 
interactions and outcomes, environmental impact and external reputation. 
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2. Theoretical foundations 
The theoretical framework of this research project is based on Stakeholder Theory, 
Organizational Legitimacy Theory and Agency Theory. We rely on Stakeholder 
Theory to shed light on stakeholder expectations and consequently on Corporate 
Social Responsibility values. Organizational Legitimacy Theory explains the 
rationale behind the organizational decision to engage in Corporate Social 
Responsibility policies and activities. Finally, Agency Theory makes reasonable our 
choice of analyzing directors’ socio demographic characteristics instead of  top 
managers’ ones, even if the latter are responsible of Corporate Social Responsibility 
implementation. 
 
2.1  Stakeholder Theory 
Corporate  Social Responsibility can be conceived as a discourse  between the 
company and its major stakeholders including shareholders, customers, suppliers, 
employees, governments, NGOs, pressure or environmental groups, regulators and 
the community. Hence, to understand the dimensionality of Corporate Social 
Responsibility values picking out  main stakeholders, we use Stakeholder Theory to 
support our research ( Waldman et al., 2006). A number of authors have relied on 
Stakeholder Theory to explain social performance and have pointed out that 
stakeholder power is positively correlated with social performance and that taking 
into account key stakeholders lead to higher social performance.  
Freeman, in contrast with Shareholder Theory argued by Friedman, advanced the 
idea that  value creation means not only maximizing shareholders’ returns and the 
financial performance is only one dimension of whom values in comprised by.  
Stakeholders are those who are affected by companies’ activities and outcomes and  
how organizations treat them and other stakeholders and , at the same time, 
influence organizations’ decisions and strategies. Stakeholders’ decision to 
cooperate in the value creating activities and establish a long-lasting relationship of 
collaboration, fairness and reciprocation with the firm depends on their preferences 
that arise from the perceived utility obtained by transactions, relationships and 
interactions with firms. Perceived utility is function of goods and services, 
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organizational justice, affiliation and perceived opportunity costs. Traditionally, 
firms supply goods and services in exchange for payment. For instance, employees 
provide time and efforts in exchange for fair wages, safety of workplace and other 
benefits. Organizational justice is associated with fairness of received outcomes and 
rules and procedures  and well-treatment of stakeholders in their interactions with 
the company. Stakeholders also receive utility from identification with the firm due 
to values sharing. Opportunity costs consist of renunciation to utility that 
stakeholders would get if they would engage with other companies.  Through value 
creation, organizations contribute to stakeholder well-being satisfying their 
expectations and interests which are generally joined or even overlapping but not 
conflicting. Harrison and Wicks ( 2013) suggested happiness as a more 
comprehensive and meaningful measure of value provided to stakeholders which is 
more complex than only economic returns. Happiness goes beyond the mere 
satisfaction of  interests and is defined as “ the way stakeholders feel about the 
intangible and tangible utility they receive through their association and interactions 
with the firm”. 
Moreover, Freeman noticed that stakeholders would adopt principles of fair 
contracting that entail stakeholder- oriented management and board representation 
(Child and Marcoux, 1999). Freeman divided stakeholder management process into 
four steps:  (1) identification of stakeholder groups according to issues addressed ; 
(2) individuation of interests and importance of each group; (3) determination of the 
effective capability of  meeting needs and expectations; (4) changes of policies and  
priorities to satisfy expectations not yet met.  
Customers’ expectations are contingent with functional, social and emotional 
benefits of Corporate Social Responsibility and are predictors of customer 
attraction, retention and trust. Functional value is the benefit that customers get by 
the availability of products and services; social value is associated with the 
acknowledgement that that the purchase is in line with social norms; emotional 
value refers to benefits for the society or the environment derived from the 
purchase. Employees expect functional, economic, psychological and ethical 
benefits. Functional benefits arise from  a fulfilling, stimulating and challenging 
work; economic benefits are related to the compensation; psychological benefits 
come from an involvement in a valued role;  ethical benefits are tied to fair and 
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equal treatment within the firm. Community expects socially responsible behavior in 
the environmental context, regulatory and compliance issues and  disclosure. 
Literature have remarked on the importance of taking into account also stakeholders 
who have not a direct stake or claim but that can impact on organizational outcomes, 
reputation and image such as media. Meeting these demands allow companies to 
increase revenues and profitability, to reduce costs, to easily obtain financial 
resources and to improve capability to innovate ( Mason and Simmons, 2014). In the 
same vein, other authors have inferred organizational survival, success, growth and 
profitability from accountability toward stakeholder demands. 
Not all stakeholders are equally important for managers, so scholars have provided 
frameworks to link stakeholder attributions to their salience for management. 
Freeman et al. suggested three dimensions of stakeholder power and influence ( i.e.  
formal or institutionalized basis, an economic basis and a societal legitimacy basis) , 
whereas Mitchell et al. ( 1997)  considered stakeholder power different from 
stakeholder legitimacy and pointed out  three drivers of stakeholder prominence: 
stakeholder power, stakeholder legitimacy and urgency of stakeholder claims. 
Empirical work in multi-utilities industry  found out that power is tied to 
institutionalized or economic base and it’s  usually recognized to regulatory bodies 
and industries regulators, shareholders, analysts and investors and customers. Power 
usually confers legitimacy to stakeholder claims but the equation is not automatic. It 
is fundamental  to notice that these dimensions are perception-based and not 
objectively measured ( Harvey and Schaefer, 2001). Companies should be aware of 
the interrelationships  between stakeholder groups. Actually, each member observes 
and reacts to all other stakeholders in a manner that damages the company ( Dobele 
et al., 2014). Several authors have attempted to put stakeholders in different clusters 
to help companies in their individuation.  Freeman and Reed have argued for a 
“narrow” definition of stakeholders and a “broader” one. The first notion includes 
all individuals or group of them that affect the organizational objective achievement 
and, at the same time, are influenced by organizational operation and outcomes ( i.e. 
competitors, customers, shareholders suppliers and employees). The narrow concept 
refers only to stakeholders essential for organizational survival such as employees, 
customers, investors and so on. In the same vein, Clarkson have spoken of 
“primary” and “secondary” stakeholders. A lack of primary stakeholder 
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involvement may compromise organizational survival. Furthermore, Clarkson have 
distinguished between voluntary stakeholders and involuntary stakeholders. 
Voluntary stakeholders are those who has consciously decided to be affected by 
corporate activities such as employee, shareholders, suppliers, customers and debt 
suppliers. Involuntary stakeholders are unconsciously influenced by organizational 
decisions and activities such as government, local communities and society in 
general. Finally, Carroll and Nasi have recognized a dichotomy between internal 
stakeholders and external stakeholders depending on whether the belong to 
organizational structure. Internal stakeholders are employees, managers and 
shareholders, while external ones are customers, suppliers,  competitors, 
government, media and the overall society ( Zattoni).   
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2.2  Organizational Legitimacy Theory 
Society is demanding more to companies while simultaneously trusting them less in 
light of recent corporate scandals. To restore reputation and social acceptance, 
organizations should behave in a social responsible manner involving stakeholder claim 
in their agenda. Reputation enhancement is a source of competitive advantage and an 
inimitable valuable resource. Legitimacy is the “ generalized perception or assumption 
that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions” ( Filatotchev and 
Nakajima, 2014, p. 297). Organizational Legitimacy Theory is derived from the concept 
of organizational legitimacy, which has been defined as “ a condition or status which 
exists when an entity’s value system is congruent with the value system of the larger 
social system of which the entity is a part. When a disparity, actual or potential, exists 
between the two value systems, there is a threat to the entity’s legitimacy.” ( Dowling 
and Pfeffer, 1975, p. 122). Organizational Legitimacy Theory posits that organizations 
continually seek to ensure that they operate within the bounds and norms of their 
respective societies. Legitimacy includes three dimensions: instrumental ( pragmatic), 
relational and moral. These dimensions are not applied universally and each of them has 
a different influence in the overall legitimacy judgment. Their balance depends on 
specific institutional context in a particular country. Although it has concrete 
consequences, legitimacy itself is an abstract concept, given reality by multiple actors in 
the social environment. Organizational Legitimacy Theory relies on the concept of  
“social contract” between a company and the society in which it operates. Through this 
perspective, organizational survival and growth depends on the delivery of some 
socially desirable goods to society and the distribution of economic, social or political 
benefits to groups from which it derives its power. The notion of “social contract” is 
used to represent the myriad expectations society has about how an organization should 
conduct its operations. It can be explicit or implicit, so the terms of the contract cannot 
be known exactly. Authors have posit that legal requirements provide the explicit terms 
of the contract, while other non-legislated societal expectations embody the implicit 
terms of the contract. It is considered that an organization’s survival will be threatened 
if society perceives that the organization has breached its social contract. As a result, 
consumers may reduce the demand for the organization’s products; suppliers may 
eliminate the supply of labor and financial capital to the business; or constituents may 
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lobby government for increased taxes, fines or laws to prohibit those actions which do 
not conform with the expectations of the community. 
 Legitimacy concern is strictly connected with disclosure  issue. In facts, company 
would voluntarily report on activities if management perceived that those activities were 
expected by the communities in which it operates. In particular, to gain legitimacy at the 
eyes of the society, companies need to communicate Corporate Social Responsibility 
programs, policies and achievements. This entails a problem of transparency and 
integrity in the disclosure. Actually, scholars have found that Canadian high-risk 
companies enhance their legitimacy through selectively releasing information, in 
misleading communication and ambiguous language (Lightstone and Driscoll, 2008). 
Because community expectations can change over time, the organization needs to 
communicate to show that it is also changing. Given the impacts of perceived breaches 
of the social contract for organizational survival, it is important to examine the remedial 
actions that organizations might engage in.  The notion of  ‘legitimacy gap’ have been 
developed to indicate the difference between the expectations of the stakeholders 
relating to how an organization should act, and how the organization does act. When a 
legitimacy gap occurs, there is a threat to the entity’s legitimacy. To fill this gap, 
companies may also need to  targeted disclosures, or perhaps controlling or 
collaborating with other parties who, in themselves, are considered to be legitimate  
Where managers perceive that the organization’s actions are not commensurate with the 
‘social contract’, they  may take remedial action to become legitimate. Because the 
theory is based on perceptions, for remedial action to have an effect on external parties, 
it must be accompanied by public disclosure. Hence the importance of public corporate 
disclosures, such as those made within annual reports and other publicly released 
documents. It has been argued that this may be because companies in different 
industries have differing motivations towards legitimacy owing to the different 
perceptions that society has with regard to their activities, and how the management of 
the companies themselves perceive opinions about them. Empirical works have 
contended that the level and patterns of disclosure by a company may vary depending 
on whether the company’s main product has mainly negative connotations or whether 
the company’s main product is an essentially desirable product which may give rise to 
some undesirable by-products . Specifically, they argued that, in the case of structurally 
illegitimate companies, it is likely that legitimacy can never be attained in the eyes of 
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some constituencies and the objective cannot be to restore something they never had. In 
such cases, the aim of disclosure might simply be to limit damage or to convince society 
that they are ‘not all that bad’. It is thus possible that companies repairing or 
maintaining legitimacy may view disclosure entirely differently from those who have to 
build or establish it (Guthrie et al., 2006). 
 Several authors have individuated four steps of  legitimacy management : establishing 
legitimacy, maintaining legitimacy, extending legitimacy and defending legitimacy. 
This first phase tends to revolve around issues of competence, particularly financial, but 
the organization must be aware of “socially constructed standards of quality and 
desirability as well as perform in accordance with accepted standards of 
professionalism”.  Maintaining legitimacy activities include ongoing role performance 
and symbolic assurances that all is well, and attempts to anticipate and forestall 
potential challenges to legitimacy. However the maintenance of legitimacy is not as 
easy as it may at first appear because community expectations are not static, but rather, 
change across time thereby requiring organizations to be responsive to the environment 
in which they operate. An organization can loose its legitimacy if it has not changed its 
activities from activities which were previously deemed acceptable. Extending 
legitimacy  is related to enters new markets or changes the way it relates to its current 
market. Companies should defend legitimacy from  being threatened by an incident, 
both internal or external. Empirical investigation have showed that companies do appear 
to change their disclosure policies around the time of major company and industry 
related social events highlighting  the strategic nature of voluntary social disclosure. 
Annual report is considered a useful device to reduce the effects upon a corporation of 
events that are perceived to be unfavorable to a corporation’s image. The loss of 
legitimacy can be accompanied by increasing government regulation, monitoring and 
possibly taxation. This can results in increasingly voluntary social and environmental 
disclosure in an effort to meet specific threats  or to communicate systemic corporate 
change. However, other researchers have argued that the lower the perceived legitimacy 
of the organization, the less the providing social and environmental disclosure.  
Some authors have marked out  two legitimacy strategies: a reactive approach and a 
proactive approach. A company can disclose information about Corporate Social 
Responsibility in reaction to a particular event or to a crisis related to the company itself 
or the industry. Otherwise a firm discloses information to prevent legitimacy concerns 
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and avoid negative consequences. An ongoing debate is associate to the perception of 
being socially responsible. Some scholars have argued that to be ranked as socially 
responsible, organizations should engage in Corporate Social Responsibility activities 
beyond laws and regulation requirement (Arvidsson, 2010).  
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3. Corporate Social Responsibility disclosure 
As a discourse, Corporate Social Responsibility is constructed through a dialogue 
between the firm and its major stakeholders publishing Corporate Social Responsibility 
report, communicating Corporate Social Responsibility values, policies and practices on 
their websites and responding to public inquiries ( Tang et al., 2015). 
A KPMG survey conducted in 2008 reported that 80% of the top 250 companies of the 
Global Fortune 500 ( GFT 250) issue an environmental, social or sustainability report 
compared with 35% in 1999. Furthermore, corporations increasingly integrate 
sustainability information in their annual reports in France, Norway, Switzerland, Brazil 
and South Africa as well as United Kingdom, Japan and Australia ( Amran et al., 2014). 
Reporting is a tool for communicating information outside and to monitor managerial 
behavior ( Amran et al., 2014).  
Prior scholars have identified three types of Corporate Social Responsibility 
communication: mandatory, solicited and voluntary. In facts,  organizations can be 
required to provide information by regulatory agency, or stakeholders can put pressure 
to obtain a specific piece of  information, or finally disclosure can be a discretionary 
organizational decision. The majority of Corporate Social Responsibility related 
information is voluntary ( Tang et al., 2015), even if empirical surveys have pointed out 
the managerial request for more regulations and standards ( Arvidsson, 2010). The main 
communication channels are annual reports and corporate Websites. 
Due to the importance of communication concerns, companies attribute its stewardship 
and structuring  to a specific appointed figure who can be an “ Investor Relation 
Manager” or a “ Chief  Information Officer”. An empirical investigation among large 
listed Swedish companies have revealed a trend shift of communication of non-financial 
information toward a focus on Corporate Social Responsibility items. The increasing 
interest for Corporate Social Responsibility issues of investors, media and community 
in general was attributed to the need of restoring organizational image and reputation 
and gaining trust after recent scandals that  have cast a shadow over organizational 
management. The users of Corporate Social Responsibility information was revealed to 
be  mainly the actors of stock markets ( i.e. investors/owner, financial analysts and  
investments banks) who wants to undertake conscious investments and the firm itself to 
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use it as a tool of management control. What is more, interviewees considered the 
increasing interest and demand of stakeholders as the major reason for engaging in 
Corporate Social Responsibility activities and, consequently, disclosure. Other motives 
are the objective to avoid their Corporate Social Responsibility being evaluated the 
worst and the creation an image of responsible company. This investigation have also 
highlighted  two main problems regarding communication: the lack of CSR-related 
standards ( e.g. data and statistics)  that validate information and allow comparisons and 
the lack of CSR-related measures to convert Corporate Social Responsibility 
achievements into economic outcomes in order to make them suitable for spread-sheet. 
To overcome these difficulties both investments banks and financial organizations ( e.g. 
European Federation of Financial Analysts and Society of Investment Professionals in 
Germany ) have introduced key performance indicators to facilitate companies in 
communicating non-financial information and to help investors in their decision making 
process. Moreover, in 1997 the Global Reporting Initiative ( GRI) have been developed 
introducing a global reporting framework for economic, environmental and social 
performance. Today more than 1000 companies worldwide report according to GRI ( 
Arvidsson, 2010, p. 343). These are important but insufficient steps that pave the way to 
future research to provide solutions. Because of this lack of standards, there is 
skepticism among stakeholders to Corporate Social Responsibility disclosure. 
Therefore, to avoid the self promoters’ paradox and loss of credibility, companies 
should communicate both progresses and failures without disclosing a too high 
Corporate Social Responsibility profile ( Arvidsson, 2010). 
Academics have supported the idea that to be effectively communicated, Corporate 
Social Responsibility values should be part of corporate identity. The gradual 
implementation of Corporate Social Responsibility activities into core activities is 
associated with different stages of Corporate Social Responsibility disclosure depending 
on different and deeper stakeholder involvement. However, empirical analysis on 
Danish companies have showed a lack of integration and even conflict between 
Corporate Social Responsibility values and corporate values. This misalignment is 
attributed to the relative recent approach to Corporate Social Responsibility, national, 
sociopolitical, cultural and industrial context and educational and professional 
background of Corporate Social Responsibility managers. Additionally,  
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communication is considered to be instrumental rather than strategic in nature ( 
Schmeltz, 2014).  
According to Agency Theory, disclosure decreases agency cost because of the reduction 
of informational asymmetry between the firm and investors, the transparency among 
social and environmental impact and improvement of compliance and reliability due to 
changes in internal control systems ( Cheng et al., 2014). Moreover authors have found 
that Communication influences organizational members’ attitudes and behavior by 
shaping their values and molds society’s expectations of corporations ( Tang et al., 
2015). 
 A growing body of literature has investigated why Corporate Social Responsibility 
disclosure differs among corporations. As Corporate Social Responsibility in general, 
also disclosure is affected by economic, politic, cultural and institutional factors. In 
particular, culture in associated with values, beliefs and priorities held by directors and 
managers and affects, as a result, both  quality  the quantity of disclosure ( Amran et al., 
2014). 
Researchers have stressed institutionalization as a more significant predictor of 
Corporate Social Responsibility disclosure than other variables. Actually, an empirical 
comparison between Chinese  and U.S. companies’ Corporate Social Responsibility 
disclosure has pointed out a trend of standardization of frameworks and contents toward 
U.S model. Notwithstanding these challenges, differences of  rationales, practices and 
themes communicated remains. U.S. companies have a more comprehensive and 
standardized approach and put emphasis on ethical rationale while Chinese companies 
are driven by an economic rationale. Besides, U.S companies are more like to  discuss 
about product safety and employee treatment ( i.e. fair wages, equal opportunities and 
development programs).   
Industry is another predictor of Corporate Social Responsibility disclosure: companies 
in heavy industries tend to highlight responsibility toward their employees and the 
environment, while organizations targeting at consumers discuss about philanthropy and 
education. Moreover, it has been observed that national governance standards and the 
institutionalization of norms and regulations affect Corporate Social Responsibility 
disclosure ( Filatotchev and Nakajima, 2014).  
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At a firm level,  the heterogeneity of  Corporate Social Responsibility reporting is due 
to shareholder/ownership structure ( Nitm and Soobaroyen, 2013; Lybaert,2011; 
Gamerschlag et al.,2011; Ghazali, 2007), directors’ independence (Nitm and 
Soobaroyen, 2013, level of debt, profitability (Lybaert,2011; Gamerschlag et al.,2011; 
Reverte,2009) and the nature of the auditor ( Lybaert, 2011; Eng and Mak, 2003; 
Gamerschlag et al.,2001). Empirical analysis have found out that companies  in which 
government is a major shareholder discloses more information about Corporate Social 
Responsibility ( Ghazali, 2007; Lybaert, 2011;  Nitm and Soobaroyen, 2013) as well as 
companies with dispersed ownership structure ( Gamerschlag et al.,2011).  Conversely, 
organizations in which directors hold a high amount of shares disclose less CSR-related 
information ( Ghazali, 2007; Lybaert, 2011) as well as organizations in which family 
member are in board of directors or management team. Generally speaking, firms with 
concentrated ownership structure are less likely to disclose Corporate Social 
Responsibility practices and achievements because these companies are subjected to 
lower external pressures and interests, thus removing benefits reducing conflicts of 
interest between managers and ownership of such disclosure (  Nitm and Soobaroyen, 
2013; Barnea and Rubin, 2010). However, the positive impact of government ownership 
on Corporate Social Responsibility practices is not obvious, but it depends on quality of 
governance in terms of corruption and fraud (Nitm and Soobaroyen, 2013; Wu, 2009; 
Hou and Moore, 2010): that is, in countries with high level of governmental corruption, 
high government ownership can lead to less Corporate Social Responsibility 
involvement (Nitm and Soobaroyen, 2013; Wu, 2009; Hou and Moore, 2010). 
Furthermore, Corporate Social Responsibility is affected by institutional ownership ( 
Aguilera et al.,2006; Oh et al.,2011; Nitm and Soobaroyen, 2013) such as investment 
funds and pension funds. Due to the high amount of shares that they cannot easily sell, 
they are particularly involved in monitoring activities and therefore require several 
information related also to Corporate Social Responsibility activities ( Nitm and 
Soobaroyen, 2013). However, empirical researchers have pointed out both positive ( 
Dam and Scholtens, 2012; Harjoto and Jo,2011; Jo and Harjoto, 2011,2012; Oh et 
al.,2011; Nitm and Soobaroyen, 2013) and negative ( Barnea and Rubin, 2010; Nitm 
and Soobaroyen, 2013) impact of institutional ownership and Corporate Social 
Responsibility disclosure. 
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The influence of the level of debt is controversial and studies have showed both  
positive and negative impact ( Lybaert, 2011; Gamerschlag et al.,2011; Reverte,2009; 
Roberts, 1992; Eng and Mak, 2003). Profitability ( using ROA as measure) is associated 
with higher level of Corporate Social Responsibility disclosure (Lybaert,2011; 
Gamerschlag et al.,2011; Reverte,2009). Furthermore, studies have revealed that firms 
are more likely to provide more information when they have auditors from the big-four  
(Eng and Mak, 2003; Gamerschlag et al.,2001). Board size, independence and gender 
diversity have been related to Corporate Social Responsibility disclosure (Nitm and 
Soobaroyen, 2013). A smaller board have been found to be more effective than a bigger 
one leading to a more proactive managerial and board behavior, a less opportunistic 
management behavior and more accurate earnings information. This, in turn, improve 
quality reporting. An ideal board size is approximately 11 people, as noticed by 
researchers. However, other findings have showed no relationship between board size 
and disclosure quality. Board independence have been both positively and negatively 
associated with disclosure. In the first case, independence in considered a monitoring 
mechanism in preventing managerial opportunism and an assurance of stakeholders’ 
expectation satisfaction. Therefore independence is associated with higher 
accountability and transparency. In the last case,  it have been showed that outside 
directors voluntarily decrease information reported because they are substitute for each 
other in monitoring managers. Boards with three or more women tend to disclose more 
Corporate Social Responsibility information and to include an assurance report 
enhancing reporting credibility and quality. Women are more sensitive about social and 
environmental issues than men. Organizational structure of communicating process 
influences the quality of reporting. Especially, the presence of a Corporate Social 
Responsibility committee within the board is a driving force of high quality reporting. 
When Corporate Social Responsibility values are embedded in vision/mission, it 
benefits reporting quality. In addition,  strategic partnerships, especially those with 
NGOs, improve the level of reporting quality thanks to sharing of critical resources, 
new knowledge and synergistic solutions that influences organizational culture and 
strategic management strategies ( Amran et al., 2014). An empirical work found that 
communication in Indian companies is top-down and founder lead without involving 
employees and other stakeholders. Based on these features, Amaladoss et al. ( 2013) 
developed a communication model. After the establishment of communication 
objectives for both internal and external stakeholders, the model provides two 
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distinctive processes for engaging in Corporate Social Responsibility: a top-down 
approach and an inside-out approach. The top-down process means that all stakeholders 
are involved: from CEOs, to the last employee, to the wider stakeholders. According to 
the inside-out approach, organizations should ensure a deep commitment in Corporate 
Social Responsibility within the firm before communicating it outside ( Amaladoss et 
al., 2013). 
Despite common institutional pressures ( they can emanate from investors, customers, 
regulators and so on) , companies have heterogeneous responses consisting in different 
strategies. Some scholars have argued that this is due to managerial characteristics and 
attitudes that influences managerial preferences and perceptions of external requests.  
Lewis et al. (2014) have investigated the relationship between CEO characteristics and 
environmental disclosure, demonstrating that CEOs who have MBA degrees are more 
likely to disclose than CEOs with legal degrees. Besides, newly appointed CEOs are 
more likely to disclose voluntary environmental information than long-tenured CEOs. 
CEOs have the power a and the ability to influence organizational decision making 
process and imprint their values and cognitive styles upon their firms. Benefits and 
costs of environmental disclosure are uncertain and so subject to managerial 
interpretation. This interpretation of environmental disclosure as an opportunity or as a 
threat depends on CEO characteristics. In particular they focused their attention on 
educational background and tenure. Empirical researchers have found that MBA degree 
is associated with aggressive strategies as more capital expenditure, more debt, high 
level of diversification and fewer dividends. This can be a consequence of more skilled 
strategic decision making process and a greater capability of recognize opportunities. 
On the other hand, legal degree is related to risk aversion and the tendency of acting 
conservatively and sticking the status quo. Tenure is associated with rigidity and 
commitment to established policies and practices as long-tenured CEOs are resistant to 
organizational changes; while newly appointed CEOs  are more willing to innovate 
strategies thanks to an open mind set on how the firm should be run. Past researcher 
pointed out that CEO power increase over time because of  cooptation with CEO 
appointees, major loyalty of subordinates and institutionalization of informal power.  
This increased power is manifested in the capability to resist and ignore  pressures for 
changes and greater autonomy ( Lewis et al., 2014). 
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Chapter 2. The influence of Board of Directors on Corporate Social Responsibility 
1. Board of Directors: structure, composition and tasks 
The board of directors has three primary  tasks: a strategic role, a control role and a 
service role. The strategic role consist of the formulation of goals and strategies to reach 
them, as well as the allocation of resources needed ( Hung, 2011; Zahra and Pearce, 
1989). The control role involves monitoring and rewarding managerial action and 
performance ( Hung, 2011; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). The service role can be considered 
a link between the organization and the external environment and entails representing 
and protecting organizational interests in society and assuring access to critical 
resources (Hung, 2011; Zahra and Pearce, 1989)  . Literature have pointed out  these 
different tasks of board of directors consistent with different theoretical perspectives. 
The legalistic perspective have showed that the board has a control role and a service 
role according to legally mandated responsibilities . The first involves the evaluation of 
the adequacy of organizational, administrative and accounting structure and the 
monitoring of the organizational performance as well as managerial initiatives in order 
to satisfy shareholders’ interest of  value creation. The latter has impacts on 
organizational reputation, external relationships and support to executives decision 
making. Through these  theoretical lenses, the board is neither  involved in day to day 
activities nor  in the development of strategies and policies, but it should represent 
interests of shareholders assuring organizational growth ( Carpenter, 1988; Ewing, 
1979; Mattar and Ball, 1985; Mueller, 1979; Vance, 1983; Zahra and Pearce, 1989; 
Louden, 1982; Chapin 1986; Rigolini,2013). 
The resource dependence approach have added the strategic role to the previous ones.  
The prestige of directors among society can benefit companies allowing them to get 
legitimacy and consensus and to access resources critical for operations. This means 
that directors are involved in the strategic decision making process through own 
initiatives,  analysis and advices ( Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Rigolini,2013).  
The class hegemony perspective sees the board of directors as a representation of  the 
power of a capitalist elite within the firms in order to control the social and economic 
institution and  the overall wealth ( Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Rigolini, 2013).  
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The last perspective refers to the agency theory. This theory recognizes that there is a 
conflict of interest between shareholders and top executives. Actually, executives have a 
short-term vision that is in contrast   with long-term value creation objective of 
shareholders. Consistent with this view, the board of directors is a control mechanism 
against self-interest and opportunistic managerial behavior in order to ensure 
shareholders value maximization ( Zahra, 1996; Rigolini, 2013). In addition to this 
control task, board of directors is provided by the development of strategies, guidelines 
and policies.  
According with institutional theory the role of the board is based on institutionalized 
and legitimizing norms and rules. These consist in decisions about CEO selection, 
executives’ compensation and CEO incentive plans ( Di Maggio and Powell, 1983; 
Rigolini, 2013). 
Social network theory explains board of directors  role as a resource supplier and 
network sponsor highlighting  the service role ( Lynall et al., 2003; Larson 1992; 
Rigolini, 2013). 
Another stream of literature have combined the extant body of literature to explain that 
an additional function of the board is to ensure that top executives implement corporate 
entrepreneurial activities. These activities are high-risk, time consuming and expensive 
even if they have the objective to improve wealth combining resources in new ways, 
developing new business or initiate  strategic renewal ( Guth and Ginsberg, 1990; 
Sharma and Chrisman, 1999; Vorzikis et al., 1999; Hitt et al., 2001;  Rigolini, 2013). 
The board of directors is a source of cognitive resource, new  and different perspectives, 
problem solving capability and knowledge that addresses and encourage  managerial 
decisions toward corporate entrepreneurship activities. Furthermore, directors are able 
to support top executives in identifying new opportunities for growth  thanks to their 
experience and skills and to provide valuable resources. This can lead to an alignment 
of interests of executives and shareholders and to an enhancement of organizational 
performance and to value creation ( Huse, 2007; Rigolini, 2013). In accordance with all 
these findings, the role of board of directors can be summarized in a monitoring 
function ( that refers the control role) and an entrepreneurial function ( that includes 
both service and strategic role).  
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Recently academics have pointed out  that directors’ role should shift from being based 
primarily on controlling executives to be a more proactive and holistic role 
(Hung,2011). They have spoken about corporate directors’ social responsibility roles 
explaining that directors, through their decisions, induce implementation of Corporate 
Social Responsibility concerns in day-to-day activities in order to meet stakeholder 
expectations. These roles refers both to stakeholders of organization and to organization 
as stakeholder. Considering stakeholders of the organization, the board of director has 
both a direction-setting and a guardian role ( Hung, 2011). Actually, directors are 
involved in addressing the future direction of the organization by establishing 
objectives, developing strategies to get them and policies through which operate. 
Moreover, directors can be considered as “agents” of stakeholders and so they have to 
protect their interests by dealing with social and environmental issues to satisfy 
stakeholder demands exerting strict control mechanisms among senior executives. The 
actors of the external environment can affect both positively and negatively 
organizational performance, especially government through purchases, regulations and 
legislations regarding political, technical and  social issues. This means that 
corporations need to protect their interest against negative environmental impact. 
Through this perspective, the board of directors has both a social networking and a 
social participation role ( Hung, 2011). The social networking role is linked to the 
interlocking phenomenon, that is, when  a director of an organization seats also on the 
board of another organization. They are expected to have the willingness to promote the 
interests of the firms in which they are involved and the means to do that thanks to their 
social capital ( i.e. the relational assets brought inside the board by each director).  The 
concept of social capital helps to better understand how networks form, spread and 
work.  Through interlocking, they form an inner circle network of individuals who are 
expected to be actively involved in organizational interests’ protection and enhancement 
influencing public policies ( Bond, 2004; Useem, 1983; Hung, 2011). This results not in 
a reduction of dependence by political actions, but it helps to decrease uncertainties of 
the dependence ( Hung, 2011). According to the social participation role, directors 
should carry out social activities within the bounds and norms of their respective 
societies. In so doing, activities are perceived as being legitimate ( Deegan, 2002; Gulati 
and Westphal, 1999; Hung, 2011) and, in turn, organizational reputation and image are 
improved. 
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In the attempt to regulate corporate governance and preventing failures ( e.g. Enron, 
WorldCom) a Code of Corporate Governance was enacted. Companies are not required 
but encouraged to apply with it. About board of directors functions, it states that it may 
“ (a) examine and approve the strategic, operational and financial plans of both the 
issuer and the corporate group it heads, monitoring periodically the related 
implementation; it defines the issuer’s corporate governance and the relevant group 
structure; (b) define the risk profile, both as to nature and level of risks, in a manner 
consistent with the issuer’s strategic objectives; (c) evaluate the adequacy of the 
organizational, administrative and accounting structure of the issuer as well as of its 
strategically significant subsidiaries in particular with regard to the internal control 
system and risk management; (d) specify the frequency, in any case no less than once 
every three months, with which the delegated bodies must report to the Board on the 
activities performed in the exercise of the powers delegated to them; (e) evaluate the 
general performance of the company, paying particular attention to the information 
received from the delegated bodies and periodically comparing the results achieved with 
those planned; (f) resolve upon transactions to be carried out by the issuer or its 
controlled companies having a significant impact on the issuer’s strategies, profitability, 
assets and liabilities or financial position; to this end, the Board shall establish general 
criteria for identifying the material transactions; (h) perform at least annually an 
evaluation  of the performance of the Board of Directors and its committees, as well as 
their size and composition, taking into account the professional competence, experience 
( including managerial experience) gender of its members and number of years as 
director. Where there the Board of  Directors avails of consultants for such a self-
assessment, the Corporate Governance Report shall provide information on other 
services, if any, performed by such consultants to the issuer or to companies having a 
control relationship with the issuer; (i) taking into account the outcome of the evaluation 
mentioned under the previous item; (g) report its view to shareholders on the 
professional profiles deemed appropriate for the composition of the Board of Directors, 
prior to its nomination; (j) provide information in the Corporate Governance Report on 
(1) its composition, indicating for each member the relevant role held within the Board 
of Directors ( including by way of example, chairman or the chief executive officer, as 
defined by article (2), the main professional characteristics as well as the duration of 
his/her office since the first appointment; (2) the application of the article 1 of this Code 
and, in particular, on the number and average duration of meetings of the Board and of 
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the executive committee, if any, held during the fiscal year, as well as the related 
percentage of attendance of each director; (3) how the self-assessment procedure as at 
previous item (g) has developed; (k) in order to ensure the correct handling of corporate 
information, adopt, upon  proposal of the managing director or the chairman of the 
Board of Directors, internal procedures for the internal handling and disclosure to third 
parties of information concerning the issuer, having special regard to price sensitive 
information”.  
The capability of the Board of Directors to effectively carry out its role is tied to four 
board attributes: composition, characteristics ( demographic characteristics and board 
personality), structure and process ( Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Rigolini, 2013).  
Board composition refers to the size of the board ( i.e. the number of directors included) 
and the mix of director types distinguishing between inside and outside directors. 
Researchers have discovered both positive and negative impact of board size on 
corporate performance. Actually, it have been observed that  large boards have more 
expertise, knowledge and skills and are more easily provided of critical resources ( 
Coodstein et al.,1994; Rigolini, 2013). Besides, a large board relies on several 
perspectives and contributions on corporate strategy development and reduces the 
domination by the CEO ( Van de Berghe and Levrau, 2004; Rigolini, 2013) affecting 
positively, as a result, company size, diversification ( Pearce and Zhara, 1992; Rigolini, 
2013) and internationalization ( Sanders and Carpenter, 1998; Rigolini, 2013). Thanks 
to the amount of skills and knowledge within the board, companies are more likely to 
exploit entrepreneurial opportunities. Conversely, smaller boards are usually dominated 
by CEO ( Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Chaganti, Mahajan and Sharma, 1985; Rigolini, 
2013) and, thus, are less effective and less powerful. However, there is a point break 
over that increasing the number of directors have been shown to be contra-productive. 
In large boards, directors are less able to be actively involved in discussions and 
deliberations and the control role among executives can be inhibited. Moreover, large 
boards face problems of coordination ( increasing coordination costs), cohesiveness, 
organization and communication as well as conflicts among directors, mistrust and 
hostility. This results in less motivation, cohesiveness and participation; the 
communication tends to be formal, the informal method of coordination less effective ( 
Cohen and Bailey, 1997; Rigolini, 2013) and the decision making process slower ( 
Mueller and Baker, 1997; Rigolini, 2013). 
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On the other hand, communication within a smaller board is more freely and informal. 
Board size is a  balancing mechanism between shareholder wealth protection and 
shareholder wealth creation. 
Considering types of directors, it should be noticed that insiders are current or former 
employees, while outsiders are not members of the top management team, their 
associates or families, they are not employees of the firm or its subsidiaries, they are not 
members of the immediate past top management group ( Jones and Goldber, 1982; 
Rigolini,2013, p.44). Type also includes the representation on minorities such as ethnic 
minorities and representation of female within the board. Outsiders are more likely to 
pursue wealth protection and creation because of a more pervasive monitoring of 
executives’ activities, a capability to discover new opportunities ( Hillman and Dalziel, 
2003; Tuggle et al., 2010; Rigolini, 2013), to provide scarce or strategic resources ( 
Lynall et al., 2003; Tuggle et al., 2010) and engage in corporate entrepreneurship 
activities, a more objective oversight on strategic decision making process than insiders. 
Besides, outsiders are better able to objectively evaluate the validity of information 
provided by senior executives about their activities. Literature has shown that directors 
should be recruited to complement their different social and human capital, but if they 
are too far from knowledge and expertise within the firm their contribution may be 
limited. The lack of outsiders’ intimate knowledge of and information about the firm, its 
history, its strategy and its management style can lead them to short-term and low-risk 
focus affecting negatively wealth creation. Moreover, insiders have been associated 
with strategy innovativeness ( Hill and Snell, 1988; Rigolini,2013) and higher level of 
R&D spending ( Baysinger et al., 1991; Rigolini,2013) ensuring, as a result, wealth 
creation. Furthermore, recent studies have suggested that a majority of insiders is 
desirable to improve corporate entrepreneurship. 
Characteristics involves both director background and the overall “ personality” of the 
board beyond individual characteristics of directors.  The individual background 
includes age, educational background, values and experiences of directors. The board 
has its own personality and distinct way of conduct that is mold by directors’ 
independence from management ( Geneen, 1984; Rigolini, 2013), directors’ preferences 
and interest in the firm. Board personality is believed to be more enduring than the 
characteristics of individual directors ( Lynch, 1979; Rigolini, 2013, p. 45) and to 
change only if  board composition and directors’ background change. Both board 
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personality and demographic traits have been tied to higher sharing of information 
about the strategy in board meetings ( Westphal and Bednar, 2005; Rigolini, 2013) and 
to the focus on internal issues rather than external ones.  Homogeneity or heterogeneity 
of demographic characteristics among directors has a relevant impact on board 
functioning and performing and on relationships between its members. When directors 
have similar traits they tend to maintain the status quo without relevant strategic 
changes, introduction of innovative ideas and entrepreneurial activities. Despite 
conformity and a lack of openness to new information ( Wiersema and Bantel, 1992; 
Rigolini, 2013), homogeneity of traits lead to diminishing conflicts and thus more 
cohesiveness, more effective communication, faster consensus, higher level of trust and 
frequent and informal interaction between directors thanks to interpersonal attraction 
that they feel due to their similarities. On the other hand, heterogeneity improves the 
quality of the decision making process thanks to cognitive conflicts generated by a 
wider range of perspectives associated to individual skills, experiences and knowledge ( 
Rigolini, 2013).  When a board has a strong, collaborative and independent personality, 
it ensures that its members are more willing to protect shareholders’ wealth by 
monitoring executives and encouraging them to pursue entrepreneurial activities ( 
Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Rigolini, 2013). Besides, directors are stimulated to dedicate 
adequate time to their role, to be actively involved in seeking information, working in 
teams, participating to discussions, promoting constructive perspectives and views’ 
sharing, to be honest, positive and collaborative. 
Board structure is the frame of the board into committees and the definition of rules that 
improve efficacy and efficiency of the board.  This frame enable a monitoring action 
over corporate activities and a protection of shareholders’ wealth ( Kesner, 1988;  
Bianchi Martini et al., 2012; Rigolini, 2013). Literature has suggested two different 
specialized categories of committees: productivity committees (e.g. finance, investment 
and strategic) and monitoring committees ( e.g. audit, compensation and nomination) ( 
Klein, 1995; Rigolini, 2013). Productivity committees are in charge of strategic and 
entrepreneurial decision making as well as of new opportunities to support wealth 
growth. Monitoring committees deal with evaluation and control of managerial 
activities and promotion of engagement in entrepreneurial activities. Each committee 
should specialize in either entrepreneurial or monitoring issues. A specialized structure 
enhance board performance both in productivity and in monitoring ( Klein, 1995; 
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Rigolini, 2013). In particular, this specialization allows a more pervasive control among 
top management team favored by information sharing during meeting, a deeper 
evaluation of and involvement in entrepreneurial activities ( Harrison, 1987; Rigolini, 
2013) and a stronger commitment in wealth creation and protection. Directors should be 
well prepared to participate in committees to provide an appropriate contribute for 
corporate growth ( Huse, 1995; Gabrielsson and Winlund, 2000; Rigolini, 2013). It have 
been posit that the number of committees is positively associated with the board’s 
ability to promote ( through monitoring committees) and enhance ( through productivity 
committees) corporate entrepreneurship ( Rigolini, 2013, p. 56).  Another element of 
board structure is committee membership, that is the composition of each committee. 
Authors have put forward that monitoring committees are primarily comprised of 
outside directors who are independent from management team. This composition brings 
benefits in terms of outstanding debt and free cash flow ( Klein, 1995; Rigolini, 2013). 
On the other hand, productivity committees are primarily comprised of inside directors. 
This affects positively firm’s productivity measured by relative net income, productivity 
of capital expenditures and stock market returns ( Klein, 1995; Rigolini,2013). 
However, the presence of outsiders within committees have been found to positively 
influence both strategic and monitoring role of the board due to their wider expertise, 
skills and knowledge ( Kesner, 1988; Klein, 1995; Spira and Bender, 2004; Rigolini, 
2013). Even if laws and regulations don’t allow the presence of executive directors in 
some committees ( especially monitoring committees), scholars have argued that the 
presence of one or two members of the management team within committees enhance 
wealth creation and promotion because executives make committees’ member 
adequately informed about day-by-day operations ( Rigolini, 2013). 
Board process refers both to board organization ( Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Rigolini, 
2013) and to the presence of rules that enable the board to work more efficiently ( Huse, 
1995; Rigolini, 2013).The efficiency of the decision making process within the board is 
affected by the frequency and the length of meetings, CEO-board interface, the level of 
consensus among directors on issues at hand,  the formality of board proceedings and 
the extent to which the board is involved in evaluating itself ( Muller, 1979; Vance, 
1983; Rigolini, 2013). Meetings can be run both formally and informally influencing, as 
a result, the extent of communication. The board should be provided of rules and 
routines about board agenda, the convocation of meetings, accurate protocols, formal 
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work division among directors ( Rigolini, 2013) and communication concerns. Directors 
should receive timely and adequate information before meetings in order to participate 
actively to discussions giving advices and solutions, to take accurate decisions and to 
better suite their monitoring and strategic  role. Another element of the board process is 
the presence of an evaluation system of board performance. This evaluation system is 
not spread among companies even if recommended by many corporate governance 
codes. Having an evaluation system, allow companies to improve effectiveness because 
they become conscious of the gap between what they really do and what is expected 
from them ( Atkinson and Salterio, 2002; Cascio, 2004; Rigolini, 2013), to enhance 
trustiness and reputation thanks to the use of the evaluation system as a tool to 
communicate fairness, transparency and quality of the board’s work ( Minichilli et al., 
2007; Rigolini, 2013). 
Finally, more frequent meetings increase the opportunities to share information, to 
discuss about strategic issues and innovative initiatives, to evaluate executives’ 
operation, to keep well-informed outsiders about firm’s current situation and to monitor 
firm performance. This enables the maximization and protection of shareholder wealth. 
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2. Upper Echelon Theory 
Hambrick and Mason ( 1984)  developed a conceptual model to explain how do 
organization act as they do.  Summarizing previous researchers, they pointed out that 
organizational outcomes ( both strategic choices and organizational performance level) 
are affected by managerial backgrounds. Although this perspective is based on Top 
Management Team empirical research, it can be applied to explain how organizational 
outcomes reflect directors’ background. Behavioral Theory posit that complex decisions 
( such as strategic decisions)  reflects behavioral factors rather than the mechanical 
research of economic optimization ( Cyert and March, 1963; March and Simmon, 1958; 
Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Strategic decisions are defined as “ choices  made 
formally and informally, indecision as well as decision, major administrative choices ( 
e.g. reward systems and structure) as well as the domain and competitive  choices more 
generally associated with the term “strategy” ( Hambrick and Mason, 1984, p. 195). 
Samples of strategic choice is product innovation, unrelated diversification, related 
diversification, acquisition, capital intensity, plant and equipment newness, backward 
integration, forward integration, financial leverage, administrative complexity and 
response time.  Hambrick and Mason have noticed that each decision makers have 
his/her own set of “givens”. These givens include the cognitive base and values. The 
cognitive base is comprised of knowledge or assumptions about future events, 
knowledge of alternatives and knowledge of consequences attached to alternatives. 
Values are principles for ordering consequences or alternatives according to preference 
( Hambrick and Mason, 1984, p.195). When a decision maker faces a situation, he/she 
cannot comprehend all potential environmental and organizational stimuli, but he/she 
has only a limited field of vision and direct his/her attention toward restricted areas. 
Moreover, he/she has only a selective perception of some stimuli from the field of 
vision. This narrows the perception of phenomena even further. Finally, the information 
selected are interpreted through cognitive base and values affecting, thus, strategic 
choice. 
Researchers have found links between demographic characteristics and consumer 
preferences ( Frank and Greenberg, 1979;  Hornik and Schlinger, 1981; Hambrick and 
Mason, 1984), jury behavior ( Mills and Bohannon, 1980; Hambrick and Mason, 1984), 
type of city government ( Schnore and Alford, 1963; Hambrick and Mason, 1984), 
alcohol abuse ( Boscarino, 1979; Hambrick and Mason, 1984), values of graduate 
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business student ( Kahalas and Groves, 1979; Hambrick and Mason, 1984), job 
involvement ( Sekaran and Mowday, 1981; Hambrick and Mason, 1984),  preferences 
for nonmanagement jobs ( Ritchie and Beardsley, 1978; Hambrick and Mason, 1984), 
participation in volunteer work ( Schram and Dunsing, 1981; Hambrick and Mason, 
1984) and to beliefs about work held by managers and bluecollar workers ( 
Buchholz,1977, 1978; Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Scholars have also found the 
inverse relationship, that is, managerial backgrounds are influenced by previous 
organizational actions. Moreover, industry characteristics have been found to imprint 
the type of managerial characteristics within top executives. For example, banks are 
required by mandatory regulations to have presidents with significant banking 
experience. 
 After a deep literature review, Hambrick and Mason established that young managers 
are more inclined to pursue risky strategies ( i.e. unrelated diversification, product 
innovation and financial leverage) than older managers. Additionally, firms with 
younger managers experience greater growth  and variability in profitability from 
industry averages than firms with older managers. The primary experience in a 
functional area is another predictor of background characteristics. Organizational 
functions can be divided intro three groups:  output functions ( i.e. marketing, sales and 
product R&D), throughput functions ( i.e. production, process engineering and 
accounting) and  peripheral functions ( i.e. law and finance).  Managers with greater 
experience in outcome functions are more likely to emphasize outputs in strategic 
decision making and this is positively linked to both growth and profitability when the 
firm belong to turbulent and differentiable industries. On the other hand, the degree of 
throughput function experience is reflected in a focus on throughput in strategic 
decision making and it is positively related to  profitability in stable and commodity like 
industries. The level of peripheral function experience is positively associated with  
unrelated diversification in the firm and administrative complexity ( Hambrick and 
Mason, 1984). 
Executives who have spent several years in the organization are less likely to undertake 
strategic choices related to innovation such as product innovation  and unrelated 
diversification. This results in an increase in profitability and growth if the organization 
belong to a stable environment or in a decline of growth and profitability if the firm 
faces environmental discontinuity. When a CEO is appointed from outside, he/she tend 
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to make more changes structure, procedures and people because of less commitment to 
the status quo, to weaken who is averse to his/her appointment and to create new loyal 
relationships. As well, the nature of the industries and organizations in which executives 
was involved also matter because it shapes perceptions about opportunities  and risks ( 
Hambrick and Mason, 1984).  
Authors suggested that the amount, but not the type, of formal education is positively 
related to innovation, but it is not associated with the average performance of their 
firms. However, firms whose top managers had had little formal education experience 
higher variation from industry performance averages. Besides, organizations with 
executives highly educated are more complex administratively, that is, thoroughness of 
formal planning systems, complexity of structures and coordination devices, budgeting 
detail and thoroughness and complexity of incentive-compensation ( Hambrick and 
Mason, 1984, p.201). The socioeconomic background was also been investigated and it 
was been pointed out that executives from lower socioeconomic groups tend to pursue 
strategies of acquisition and unrelated diversification. This results in growth and 
profitability on the part of the firm ( Hambrick and Mason, 1984).  
In addition, they posit that corporate profitability is not linked to the amount of shares 
held by executives, but it is positively related to the overall income perceived by 
executives including salaries, bonuses, options, dividends and so on ( Hambrick and 
Mason, 1984). These variables are aggregated within top management team and the 
degree reached on each variable also has impact on strategic decision making process in 
terms of generation of alternatives and conflict. Looking at the entire top management 
team, it was observed that homogeneous groups are more likely to make strategic 
decisions quickly than heterogeneous groups. Considering the impact on corporate 
performance, homogeneity is positively associated with profitability in stable 
environments, while heterogeneity is positively linked to profitability in turbulent and 
discontinuous environments ( Hambrick and Mason, 1984).  
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3. How the Board of Directors affects the CSR decision making process 
The body of literature investigating the link between Corporate Governance and 
Corporate Social Responsibility issues is still not  exhaustive and empirical research on 
the previous relationship is rare. On the whole, it have been found that better-governed 
companies are more likely to engage in Corporate Social Responsibility practices than 
those poorly-governed ( Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). 
The quality of internal governance mechanisms as well as ownership structure and 
board characteristics influences Corporate Social Responsibility disclosure (Ntim and 
Soobaroyen, 2013). 
Board independence have been considered the main driver to explain Corporate Social 
Responsibility engagement (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013; Maretno and Harjoto, 2011) .  
Independent directors reduce conflicts among shareholders and executives and promote 
interests of other stakeholders and advance organizational commitment such as 
Corporate Social responsibility involvement (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013).Corporations 
with higher proportion of independent directors have been found to be more socially 
responsible (  Harjoto and Jo, 2011; Jo and Harjoto, 2011,2012; Michelon and 
Parbonetti, 2012; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013) and more willing to disclose their 
policies, practices and goals (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013; Lattemann et al., 2009; 
Barako and Brown, 2008; Brammer and Pavelin, 2008; Eng and Mak, 2003; Haniffa 
and Cooke, 2005; Hillman et al.,2001) . A more in depth-analysis showed that 
Corporate Social commitment is higher in corporations with larger, diverse and more 
independent board  because of more pressures in order to improve legitimacy and 
efficiency ( Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). Authors have also highlighted that women on 
board decrease negative practices involvement that can affect negatively corporate 
social performance because women have high empathy for these concerns (Boulouta, 
2013). However, it have been stressed that the previous statement depends on the 
construction of corporate social performance metric and are influenced by gender 
stereotypical beliefs of each culture/country ( Boulouta, 2013). Furthermore, when the  
number of women within a board increases, communication barriers drop and Corporate 
Social Responsibility rating ( measured with KLD ratings) increases too, because 
women from being a minority become a meaningful number for being heard ( Bear et 
al.,2010). This results in an enhancement of organizational reputation. KLD rating is 
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comprised by institutional strength ratings and technical strength ratings; both these 
dimensions have been found to positively affect corporate reputation. Institutional 
strength ratings measure if a firm meets stakeholder and, more in general, community 
demands through philanthropy and community support ( Bear et al., 2010). On the other 
hand, technical strength ratings measure how a company takes care of consumers, 
employees and stockholders through product quality and safety, good corporate 
governance practices and employees’ well-being ( Bear et al., 2010). Board diversity, 
both in terms of gender and in terms of ethnicity, have been positively related to 
efficiency and higher corporate financial performance ( Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). 
More diverse boards have been associated with independence, enhancement of 
legitimacy, high variance of opinions and ideas brought within the boardroom, ties to 
external environment and to stakeholders leading to a strong orientation toward 
Corporate Social Responsibility involvement( Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013; Barako and 
Brown, 2008). 
Another empirical analysis based on an examination of socially responsible firms’ board 
structure showed  that socially responsible companies have stronger governance 
mechanisms and more effective governance practices summarized in high Governance 
Index scores ( Webb, 2004). In particular, socially responsible firms are characterized 
by higher presence of women and outsiders,  a greater number of directors, a  separation 
between CEO and Chairman, ( Webb, 2004). Conversely, other researchers found that 
Corporate Social Responsibility commitment is associated with higher proportion of 
CEOs who are also chairman or members or chairman of nomination committee ( 
Maretno and Harjoto, 2011). 
Coffrey and Wang ( 1998) found that the percentage of insiders to outsiders and the 
managerial control, in terms of amount of stock owned by inside board members, are 
positively related to corporate philanthropic behavior. However, the percentage of 
women within the board have not been found significant for explaining corporate 
philanthropy. 
The importance of the presence of both women and independent directors within the 
boardroom to engage in Corporate Social Responsibility practices, was also remarked 
on by an empirical investigation of public oil and gas firms in United States. Actually, 
researchers pointed out that high number of women and independent directors within 
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board promotes the establishment of sustainability-themed alliances contributing to 
higher scores of corporate environmental performance ( Post et al., 2015). 
Regarding board structure, larger companies operating in higher-risk industries are more 
likely to create committees related to social issues driven by the need to manage 
environment and government relations ( Roy, 2009). Due to increasing environmental 
regulatory body, having a specific committee within the board to deal with these 
concerns is crucial for companies, especially those belonging to industries with high 
environmental impacts ( Roy, 2009). 
In addition board size can be considered a driver of Corporate Social Responsibility 
disclosure (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). Large boards are less dominated by CEO and 
are more likely to examine in detail every executive decision such as Corporate Social 
Responsibility disclosure, as well as they are provided by expertise, skills and variety of 
stakeholder representation ( Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). On the other hand, large 
boards are affected by coordination and communication problems Jensen, 1993; Ntim 
and Soobaroyen, 2013) that can reduce managerial monitoring leading to powerful 
managers who engage in misbehavior as reducing Corporate Social Responsibility 
disclosure ( Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). 
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Chapter 3.  Empirical Analysis 
1. Research question 
Grounded on the previous empirical literature analysis, we want to investigate if and in 
which extent socio demographic characteristics of directors are related to the amount 
and the types of information transmitted outside by organizations. As socio 
demographic characteristics we refer to social capital, human capital and demographics 
owned by each director ( Johnson et al., 2012).  
2. Sample 
Our sample is downloaded by Comprend website and refers to H&H Webranking 2014.  
Comprend is a digital corporate communications specialist that measures how well 
organizational disclosure meet stakeholder information expectations. Through 
questionnaires sent to analysts, investors, business journalists and job seekers, they 
discover how stakeholders use corporate websites and what kind of information they 
require. Then, using stakeholders’ responses they establish criteria to evaluate corporate 
websites. The criteria are grouped in sections, that are: 
• Start Page 
• About Us 
• Press 
• Financial reporting 
• The share 
• Investor relations 
• Corporate governance 
• Social responsibility 
• Career 
• Functions 
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The companies included in Webranking by Comprend are selected based on market 
capitalization. The 100 largest companies in the world (based on FT Global 500) and 
the 500 largest companies in Europe (FT Europe 500) are ranked. They also include the 
largest publicly listed companies from across the MENA region and for selected 
markets, further companies are added to ensure more extensive country list. Moreover, 
companies that are not included in the lists can request to be ranked and included in the 
“ all Webranking list”.  
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Company Total score 
1. Eni 
2. Basf 
3. Bayer 
4. Siemens 
5. Nestlè 
6. Statoil 
7. Roche 
8. BP 
9. British American Tobacco 
10. Royal Dutch Shell 
11. Novo Nordisk 
12. Daimler 
13. Novartis 
14. Unilever Certs. 
15. Johnson & Johnson  
16. AstraZeneca 
17. General Electrics 
18. BNP Paribas 
19. Sanofi 
20. ANZ 
21. GlaxoSmithKline 
22. SAP 
23. Microsoft 
24. BMW 
25. Gazprom 
26. L’Orèal  
27. Chevron 
28. Merck 
28. Rio Tinto 
30. IBM 
31. CVS Caremark 
32. Westpac 
32. Volkswagen 
34. Total 
35. Coca-Cola 
36. Anheuser-Busch Inbev 
37. United Technologies 
38. Pfizer 
39. Toronto-Dominion Bank 
39. Commonwealth Bank 
41. Verizon 
 
87 
67.1 
66 
60.6 
59.6 
56.8 
56.2 
54.2 
52.4 
51.8 
49.7 
49.6 
48.8 
48.7 
47.3 
47 
46.5 
45 
45.9 
45.1 
44.8 
44.5 
44.1 
43.3 
43.2 
43 
42.7 
41.7 
41.7 
41.4 
41.3 
41.1 
41.1 
41 
40.9 
40.7 
40.6 
40 
39.7 
39.7 
39.6 
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Company Total Score 
42. Wal-Mart Store 
43. HSBC 
44. PepsiCo 
44. Toyota Motor 
46. 3M 
47. Vodafone Group 
48. Inditex 
49. Procter & Gamble 
50. Walt Disney 
51. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing 
Co. Ltd 
52. Bristol Myers Squibb 
53. Bank of America 
54. Lloyds Banking Group 
55. Softbank 
56. Philip Morris 
57. Cisco 
58. Intel 
59. Petrobras 
60. AT&T 
61. Royal Bank of Canada 
62. McDonald’s 
62. ExxonMobil 
64. ConocoPhillips 
65. Boeing 
65. Citigroup 
65. Samsung Electronics 
68. Santander 
69. Comcast 
70. Schlumberger 
71. Home Depot 
72. Oracle 
73. MasterCard 
73. Jp Morgan Chase 
75. Union Pacific 
76. BHP Billiton 
76. Saudi Basic Industries 
76. Google 
79. Wells Fargo 
80. UnitedHealth Group 
39.3 
39.2 
38.9 
38.9 
38.4 
38.1 
37.8 
37.6 
37.4 
37.3 
 
37.2 
37 
36.5 
36.3 
36.2 
36.1 
35.9 
35.5 
35.3 
35.1 
35 
35 
34.7 
34.3 
34.3 
34.3 
34.1 
33.9 
33.4 
33 
32.3 
32 
32 
31.9 
31.5 
31.5 
31.5 
30.9 
30.1 
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Company Total Score 
81. Ambev  
82. American Express 
82. Qualcomm 
84. Gilead Science 
85. Amgen 
86. China Mobile 
87. Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
88. LVMH 
89. Visa 
90. Abbvie 
91. Sinopec 
92. Amazon.com 
93. Facebook 
94. PetroChina 
95. Bank of China 
96. China Construction Bank 
97. Apple 
98. Tencent Holdings 
99. Agricultural Bank of China 
100. Berkshire Hathaway 
29.9 
29.8 
29.8 
29.7 
29.1 
28.8 
27.6 
27.2 
26.8 
26.1 
25 
24.2 
23.5 
22.5 
21.5 
19.4 
18.6 
17.6 
14.8 
7.6 
 
Table 1.  The sample of companies 
 
Our sample of companies is comprised of 87 organizations of the previous ranked in 
2014 as the top corporations in terms of disclosure. From the initial 100 organizations 
ranked we excluded 12 companies whose financial data was not been found in the 
database used and Volkswagen because of the recent scandals related to misleading 
information about vehicle gas emission. We collected financial data from Orbis 
database and all information about directors from Bloomberg database. 
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3. Measures 
3.1 Dependent Variables 
Our dependent variables refers to the quality of Corporate Social Responsibility 
disclosure in terms of the amount of information yielded ( i.e. number of reports, 
standards and policies and the presence or absence of a CSR report) and contents ( 
represented by the number of paragraphs connected respectively to community, 
corporate governance, environment, employees, diversity and product). First of all, 
we collected data on the number of all documents downloadable from websites. 
They include reports, standards and policies such as Annual Reports, Proxy 
Statements, Sustainability reports ( if available), governance policies and codes, 
financial results ( e.g. quarterly earnings) and other documents related to social 
responsibility engagement. The variable “ CSR Report” refers to the availability of a 
Corporate Social Responsibility Report on the website and includes all documents 
related to this area even if the document is not headed“ Corporate Social 
Responsibility Report”. Hence, it also refers to Sustainability report and Global 
Citizenship Report. Each company can score “1” if the report is present or “0” 
otherwise. Actually, not all corporations provide a full report on Corporate Social 
Responsibility policies, activities and achievements. Some of them yield  Corporate 
Social Responsibility information on their websites without a single document that 
addresses these items, while others supplement their annual report with Corporate 
Social Responsibility information. After that, we divided Corporate Social 
Responsibility information in six items:  
• Community 
• Corporate Governance 
• Diversity 
• Employee 
• Environment 
• Product 
52 
 
These items are those used by Kinder Lydenberg Domini, Inc ( KLD) to measure 
Corporate Social Responsibility performance of corporations, so we expected 
companies to disclose achievements and policies related to these dimensions. 
Global Reporting Initiative also provides a framework to make sustainability 
reporting a standard practice for all companies. The framework is a reporting system 
that provides metrics and method for measuring and reporting sustainability-related 
impacts and performance. They provide two different types of Standard Disclosures: 
General Standard Disclosures and Specific Standard Disclosures. General Standard 
Disclosures includes the following items: 
• Strategy and analysis 
• Organizational profile 
• Identified material aspects and boundaries 
• Stakeholder engagement 
• Report profile 
• Governance 
• Ethics and Integrity 
On the other hand, Specific Standard Disclosures includes Disclosure on management 
approach and indicators. The latter refers to economic, environmental and social 
performance. Social performance is associated with labor practices and decent work, 
human rights, society and product responsibility. This support our choice about the 
previous items. Using a content analysis, for each item we collected the number of 
paragraphs dedicated in Annual Reports, Proxy Statements and Sustainability Reports.  
The content analysis has been defined as “ a research technique for making replicable 
and valid inferences from text ( or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use” 
( Krippendorff, 2004, p.18; Schemlz, 2014, p.244). 
Through community-related information, companies explain how they contribute to 
well-being and development of  local communities and the society as a whole increasing 
economic competitiveness, fostering relationships and investing in education to develop 
skills. In addition, corporations through foundations and donations contribute to the 
development of poorer countries providing educational and nutrition programs. 
Moreover, companies clarify how they follow corporate governance best practices, 
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disclosing information about structures, mechanisms, procedures and rules. A social 
responsible behavior entails dealing with diversity ensuring women’s economic 
empowerment as well as the re-employment of veterans and employment of minorities. 
Furthermore, socially responsible organizations take into account workplace rights 
ensuring employees safety on workplace and well-treatment as well as the opportunity 
to develop capabilities to training programs. In recent years, companies are more 
sensitive about environment and climate protection and disaster relief and are more 
willing to decrease manufacturing emissions, exploit renewable resources, use  
efficiently water without wasting it, improve energy efficiency and realizing sustainable 
packages to minimize waste and support community recycling systems and increase the 
use of renewable material. Corporations explain also how they take care of their 
customers assuring product safety and quality. 
 
3.2 Independent Variables 
Our independent variables are socio-demographic attributes of directors. For each of 
1016 directors we collected data about demographic characteristics, social capital and 
human capital. These dimensions characterize each director and the board as a whole, 
affecting the firm performance in addition and beyond to firm size and independence ( 
Johnson et al.,2012).  Demographics include age, education, gender, race or ethnicity. 
Human capital refers to experience and tenure. Social capital involves ties to entities, 
personal relationships, status/prestige. Director age have an ambiguous effect on firm 
value because it is linked both to valuable experience and higher risk aversion and 
(Katz, 1982; Miller, 1991; Platt and Platt, 2012; Johnson et al.,2012). Both educational 
degrees and the prestige of educational institutions impact on the cognitive base of 
directors and, in turn, on their decision making process. Researchers have found no ( 
Daily and Dalton, 1994; Rose,2007; Johnson et al.,2012) and positive impact ( Kim and 
Lim, 2007; Johnson et al.,2012) on firm value, positive impact on innovation ( Wincent 
et al.,2010; Johnson et al., 2012) and a negative impact on R&D expenditures ( Dalziel 
et al.,2011; Johnson et al.,2012). We investigated educational background considering 
both the type of degree and the area of studies. We constructed dummy variables for 
both dimensions. We considered three types of degree: Mba, PhD and Ms. PhD includes 
both PhD and Doctorate Degrees. We pointed out four areas of studies: business and 
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economics, science, law and humanistic and social sciences. Humanistic and social 
sciences includes Bachelor in International affairs, Bachelor in International Politics, 
Master in Communications, Bachelor in Psychology, Master in International Affairs, 
Doctorate of Political Science. Besides, we searched for universities attended by 
directors. Each director score “1” if he/she attended élite universities and “0” otherwise. 
To establish if an university can be considered élite, we based on Times Higher 
Education World Rankings 2014-2015. 
 
 
TIMES HIGHER EDUCATION RANKINGS 2014-2015 
1.California Institute of Technology  (Caltech) 
2.Harvard University 
3.University of Oxford 
4.Stanford University 
5.University of Cambridge 
6.Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) 
7.Princeton University 
8.University of California, Berkeley 
9.Imperial College London 
10.Yale University  
11.University of Chicago  
12.University of California, Los Angeles  
13.ETH Zurich (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich) 
14.Columbia University  
15.Johns Hopkins University 
 
Table 2. University Ranking 
 
 
Furthermore, we analyzed race and ethnicity of directors and categorized them into: 
white, black, Asiatic, Hispanic, African or Arab. Each director score “1” for his/her 
race/ethnicity and “0” otherwise. Multinational and ethnically diverse boards have been 
to be related to Corporate Social Responsibility ( Post et al.,2011; Wang and 
Coffey,1992; Johnson et al.,2012) and cross-national acquisitions ( Staples,2008; 
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Johnson et al.,2012), but effects on firm performance and value are mixed ( Johnson et 
al.,2012). 
 Regarding gender, we constructed a dummy variable: in particular, “1” stands for 
woman, while “0” for man. The impact of gender on firm value have been controversial, 
actually authors have pointed out positive, negative or no relationship between gender 
and firm value. They have explained this conflict considering endogenous drivers of 
board composition ( Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Johnson et al.,2012) and industry or 
cultural differences (Arfken et al.,2004; Johnson et al.,2012). 
It have been put forward that women attend a higher number of meetings than men and 
men attendance is higher when the board is diverse ( Adams and Ferreira, 2009; 
Johnson et al.,2012). Moreover gender diversity is associated with less conflicts within 
the boardroom and more strategic control and board development activities ( Nielsen 
and Huse, 2010; Johnson et al.,2012). Rhaman et al. (2011) found that the presence of 
three women on the board affect positively Corporate Social Responsibility ( Johnson et 
al.,2012). Demographic diversity within the board may balance tradeoffs between 
ensuring cohesiveness and collaboration and collecting different perspectives (Bilimoria 
and Piderit, 1994; Farrell and Hersch 2005; Johnson et al.,2012). 
Human capital refers to skills and expertise brought within  the boardroom by each 
director that affect the decision making process. Human capital is comprised with 
industry experience,  experience as CEO, experience in finance or venture capital, 
familiarity with a specific event such as firing a CEO and tenure ( Johnson et al.2012). 
Of these dimensions we considered experience as CEO and tenure. Directors with 
experiences as CEO bring an executive experience within the boardroom and influences 
corporations but the mechanisms are unclear ( Johnson et al.,2012). When CEO is 
appointed as director, the firm enjoys a positive stock market reaction (Fahlenbrach, 
Low, & Stulz, 2010; Johnson et al.,2012). Moreover, there is empirical evidence that  
non bankrupt firms have more CEOs on the board than bankrupt firms 
( Platt and Platt,2012; Johnson et al.,2012). CEOs directors have been found to have 
different priories than other directors, for example they are  more focused on 
governmental compliance ( Wang and Dewhirts; 1992; Johnson et al.,2012). However, 
 they do not appear to have greater influence than other directors (Fahlenbrach et al., 
2010; Stevenson & Radin, 2009; Johnson et al.,2012). 
Results about the relationship of tenure and firm outcome are non linear. One 
explanation for this phenomenon can be the inverted-U relationship between director 
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tenure and both corporate reputation (Musteen, Datta, and Kemmerer, 2010; Johnson et 
al.,2012) and strategic change (Golden & Zajac, 2001; Johnson et al.,2012). Past 
researchers found that the average outsider tenure is negatively related to annual 
sales growth (Kor and Sundaramurthy, 2009) . In addition, director tenure variance is 
positively related to the discussion of entrepreneurial issues during board meetings 
(Tuggle, Schnatterly, and Johnson, 2010). In contrast,  some authors discovered no 
significant relationships between both the average and variance of director tenure and 
corporate restructuring decisions ( Johnson et al.,1993; Johnson et al.,2012). 
 
Finally, social capital involves ties to other firms, personal relations and affiliations and 
social standing. Ties to other firms can compromise directors’ independence and their 
ability to monitor and this can increase managerial entrenchment leading to decay of 
shareholder interests ( Johnson et al.,2012), financial statement fraud ( Beasley, 1996; 
Johnson et al.,2012)., excessive CEO compensation and poorer firm performance (Fich 
& Shivdasani, 2007; Hoitash, 2011; Jiraporn, Kim, & Davidson, 2008; Johnson et 
al.,2012). Finally, director status, prestige, stigma and reputation signal to the market 
the status of organization affecting market value ( Kang, 2008; Johnson et al.,2012) and 
firm value ( Fich and Shivdasani,2007; Johnson et al.,2012). 
In order to analyze the social capital of directors we investigated the whole number of 
board seats held ( including companies, association, trust), board relationships, political 
occupation experience, University teaching/research experience, other occupations both 
in for-profit and in no-profit. All of the previous variable are dummy variables, so each 
director can score “1” if he/she has the specific experience or occupation and “0” 
otherwise. 
 
3.3. Control variables 
We used size, profitability and industry as control variables. Actually, large companies 
are more subject to external social and political pressures to have socially responsible 
behavior ( Arviddson, 2010), so they are more likely to provide Corporate Social 
Responsibility information. Moreover, large companies are more easily observable and  
thus more exposed to the public scrutiny ( Arviddson, 2010; Dobele et al.,2014). Large 
corporations can be considered as trend setters, so they are faster to respond to 
stakeholder demands about disclosure on Corporate Social Responsibility issues. 
Finally, more profitable companies have been found to disclose more about Corporate 
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Social Responsibility ( Gamerschlag et al., 2011; Reverte,2009; Lybaert, 2011) We 
measured corporation size through market capitalization, total assets and the number of 
companies in corporate group. On the other hand, we used ROA, cash flow and 
price/earning ratio to measure profitability. 
All companies of the sample were categorized by Comprend according to ICB ( 
Industry Classification Benchmark) supersector classification. 
Table 3. ICB superstector classfication 
 
 
 
      Code                                                                                                           Industry 
 
      0500                        Oil & Gas 
      1300 Chemicals 
      1700                        Basic Resources 
      2300                         Construction & Materials 
      2700                   Industrial Goods & Services 
      3300              Automobiles & Parts 
      3500                   Food & Beverage 
      3700                    Personal & Household Goods 
      4500                   Health Care 
      5300 Retail 
      5500 Media 
      5700                  Travel & Leisure 
      6500 Telecommunications 
      7500 Utilities 
      8300 Banks 
      8500 Insurance 
      8600                         Real Estate 
      8700                  Financial Services 
      9500                                                                                                       Technology          
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We grouped the previous industries in three categories:  
• Heavy industry 
• Consumer 
• Service 
This classification is meaningful to explain why contents of disclosure differs 
among companies in different industries. Actually, it have been discovered that 
companies in heavy industries are more inclined to highlight employee and 
environmental issues, while corporations in industries closer to retail put more 
emphasis on philanthropy and education ( O’ Connor and Schumate, 2010; Tang et 
al.,2015). The cluster “heavy industry” contains basic resources industry, oil and gas 
industry, chemicals industry and industrial goods and services industry. The cluster 
“consumer” includes health care industry, retail industry, food and beverage 
industry, technology industry, automobiles and parts industry and personal and 
household goods industry. Finally, the cluster “ service” holds financial services 
industry, banks industry, insurance industry, telecommunications industry, travel 
and leisure industry and media industry. 
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3.4 Descriptive statistics 
 
 
Dependent variables 
Variable Min Max Mean Std. Dev. 
Nr. Of Reports/Standards/Policies 9 361 101 76.4 
Community 4 20 6 5.0 
Corporate Governance 6 79 16 13.8 
Diversity 0 7 0.8 1.2 
Product 0 28 1.8 3.2 
Employee 3 30 4.5 5.7 
Environment 4 25 5.03 5.0 
Independent variables 
Variable Min Max Mean Std. Dev. 
Age 28 94 61 8.1 
Tenure 1 600 113 111.7 
Board relationships 0 350 69.7 70.7 
Board seats held 0 143 4.9 7.7 
Control variables 
Variable Min Max Mean Std. Dev. 
Market Capitalization  
95,563 mln 
$ 
729,346 mln 
$ 
141,965 mln 
$ 81,986 mln $ 
Total Assets 
31,269 mln 
$ 
772,092 mln 
$ 
175,197 mln 
$ 
180,332 mln 
$ 
Cash Flow 6,364 mln $ 
111,531 mln 
$ 15,709 mln $ 15,058 mln $ 
No of companies in corporate 
group 1,033 990,000 277,383 244,013 
 
Table 4. Discrete variables  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
60 
 
 
Our  sample of variable has in mean 141,965 million dollar of market capitalization.  
The minimum value is 95,563 million dollar and the maximum is 729, 346 million 
dollar. Considering standard deviation, we can see that values are not close to the mean. 
The mean value of total assets is 175,197 million dollar, the minimum is 31,269 million 
dollars and the maximum is 772,092 million dollars. The values are close to the mean 
one. The mean of cash flow is 15,709 million dollar, the minimum is 6,364 million 
dollar and the maximum is 111,531 million dollar. Values are close to the mean. As we 
can see, these values represent large and profitable companies. Actually, our sample is 
comprised by large listed companies ( FT 100). 
Regarding age, the minimum is 28 years old and the maximum is 94. The mean value is 
high, actually it is 61 years old. The standard deviation shows a high variance within the 
sample. The minimum value of tenure is 1 month, while the maximum is 600 months. 
This means that there are both newly appointed directors and directors long-tenured. 
The mean is 113 months. The standard deviation shows that values are close to the 
mean. 
The minimum number of board seats held is zero. Our sample of companies entails 
corporations that adopt German corporate governance model. This model contemplates 
two different boards: a management board, composed of executives, and a supervisory 
board, which have tasks and responsibilities that can be assimilated with the function of 
the Italian Shareholder meeting and Collegio Sindacale. As the role given to the 
management board in the German model is similar to the role of the board in the 
traditional model, we decided to consider in our analysis also the members of this 
board, even if is not possible define this kind of board as a real board of directors. 
The maximum of board seats held is 143, actually some directors are trustees of several 
investment funds. The mean is 4.9 and the standard deviation  shows that values are 
dispersed.  Board relationships represents the amount of directors with whom every 
director is connected and can interact with. These relationships range from zero to a 
maximum of 350. These values show that there is a high amount of ties between 
directors that imprint their social capital. These ties act as conduit for information ( 
Johnson et al.,2012) affecting the decision making process within the boardroom. 
Shifting to the number of reports, standards and policies available on corporate 
websites, we can see that there is high variance. This variance in mainly due to the 
different number of financial documents that companies transmit outside. Actually,  
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there are corporations that disclose several financial results also of previous years. 
Conversely, other companies disclose main information about current and almost two 
previous year. The minimum number of documents is 9, while the maximum is 361. 
The mean is 101 and the standard deviation is 76.4.  
Considering the content of reports, the major area of disclosure is corporate governance. 
This can be a consequence of mandatory requirements of this kind of information on 
documents addressed to investors. Moreover, diversity is the least item highlighted in 
reports, actually the minimum values is zero and the maximum is 7. The standard 
deviation don’t show high variance within the sample. The item “product” shows high 
variance. This can be due to the nature of product or to the organizational headquarter 
country. Actually, there are empirical evidence that Chinese corporations don’t discuss 
about safety of their products as well as well-being and fair treatment of their 
employees. Community and environment don’t show high variance. This means that all 
corporations are likely to disclose a similar amount of information about them. 
Generally, we can argue that Corporate Social Responsibility disclosure is at first steps 
and the amount of related information yielded is still limited. However, there is  
growing attention, responsiveness and resources addressed toward these concerns.  
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Dependent variables 
Variable % NO % YES Nr. Obs 
CSR Report 20.8 79.2 1016 
Independent variables 
Variable % NO % YES Nr. Obs 
Gender 76.6 23.4 1016 
Black  95.6 4.4 1016 
Asiatic 89 11 1016 
Hispanic 96.4 3.6 1016 
African 99.3 0.7 1016 
Arab 98.7 1.3 1016 
Attended  élite University 70 30 1015 
MBA 71.6 28.4 857 
MS 90 10 857 
PhD 74 26 856 
Business and Economics 56.2 43.8 857 
Science 62 38 857 
Law 85 15 857 
Humanistic and Social Sciences 97.4 2.6 857 
CEO in other company 83.3 16.7 1012 
Political occupation experience 77.8 22.2 1012 
University teaching/research experience 85.8 14.2 1012 
Other occupations ( Profit) 49.9 50.1 1012 
Other occupations ( No profit) 65.5 34.5 1011 
Independent variables 
Variable % NO % YES Nr. Obs 
Heavy Industry 80 20 1016 
Service 68.2 31.8 1016 
Consumer 51.8 48.2 1016 
 
Table 5. Dummy variables 
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The majority of our sample corporations provide a Corporate Social Responsibility 
Report ( 79.2%).  Only the 20.8% don’t provide this report, but it doesn’t mean that 
firms don’t provide information about Corporate Social Responsibility goals and 
progresses. Actually, these information are available on their websites and they usually 
are discussed about on the annual reports. 
Only 23.4% of directors are female. As we can see Black, Asiatic, Hispanic, African 
and Arab directors are a minority within the board. Almost all directors have an Master 
of Business Administration or a Master o Science or a PhD. Hence, we can consider 
these degree courses quite relevant to be appointed as director. Moreover, the major 
area of studies is business and economics, followed by science degrees. Law degrees 
and humanistic and social sciences degrees have low percentage. There are some 
directors ( 16.7%) who are currently appointed as CEOs in another company than the 
focus one. This means that they brought executive experience within the board affecting 
thus the decision making process ( Johnson et al.,2012). The 50.1% of directors has a 
current occupation in other companies but they have not a board membership. They can 
be executives or advisors. In addition, the 34.5% of directors analyzed is involved in  
no-profit activities engagement, representing  the sensitivity to socially addressed 
concerns. A little percentage of them have had a political experience or an experience in 
Universities as teachers or researchers.  
The majority of our sample of corporations belong to consumer industry ( i.e. 48.2%), 
while service industry  count for 31.8% of the sample and heavy industry for 20% of 
companies. Therefore, we expect that high attention is put on community issues rather 
than others. Data confirms our hypothesis, actually community item has the higher 
mean value. 
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4. Methodology 
The relation used is the following. 
 
Y = α + β1 X 1 + β2 x 2 + β n  x n+ ε 
 
Y= dependent variable 
X= independent variable 
β= coefficient of… It explains how the independent variable affects the dependent 
variable, that is, if the relationship is positive or negative 
α  = constant 
ε = error 
We have eight models because we have eight dependent variable. Our dependent 
variables are:  
• Number of reports, policies and standards  
• CSR report 
• Community 
• Corporate Governance 
• Diversity 
• Employee 
• Product 
• Environment 
 
Our independent variables are: 
• Gender 
• Age 
• Black 
• Asiatic  
• Hispanic 
• African  
• Arab 
• Attended élite University 
• Mba ( Master of Business Administration) 
• Ms ( Master of Science) 
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• PhD ( Doctor of Philosophy) 
• Business and Economics 
• Science 
• Law 
• Humanistic and Social Sciences 
• Tenure (months) 
• Board seats held 
• Political occupation experience 
• University teaching/research experience 
• Other occupations ( Profit) 
• Other occupations ( No Profit) 
• Board relationships 
 
We used  the same independent variables for all models. 
We used a OLS and Logit regression model. In particular we used the last one for the 
model in which the dependent variable is CSR report, as this is a Dummy variable. For 
the others, we used the OLS regression. Moreover,  we observed VIF in order to test for 
the collinearity. All the models were obtained using SPSS software. 
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5. Discussion 
 
 
Model 1. Dependent variable: number of reports, policies and standards 
 
 
Modello R R-quadrato R-quadrato 
corretto 
Deviazione 
standard Errore 
della stima 
Durbin-Watson 
1 ,528a ,279 ,237 60,2828 ,355 
 
Table 6. Model summing-up 
 
Modello Somma dei 
quadrati 
df Media dei 
quadrati 
F Sig. 
1 
Regressione 757173,583 31 24424,954 6,721 ,000b 
Residuo 1958733,040 539 3634,013   
Totale 2715906,623 570    
 
Table 7. Anova  
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Modello Coefficienti non standardizzati Coefficienti 
standardizzati 
t Sig. Statistiche di collinearità 
B Deviazione 
standard 
Errore 
Beta Tolleranza VIF 
1 
(Costante) 
163,845 27,225  6,018 ,000   
GENDER 2,825 6,530 ,017 ,433 ,666 ,863 1,159 
AGE -,031 ,369 -,003 -,083 ,934 ,785 1,274 
BLACK -7,212 12,019 -,023 -,600 ,549 ,885 1,130 
ASIATIC 47,802 9,891 ,187 4,833 ,000 ,896 1,116 
HISPANIC 
-16,998 15,680 -,041 -
1,084 
,279 ,950 1,052 
AFRICAN -31,479 36,521 -,033 -,862 ,389 ,913 1,095 
ARAB 47,173 30,908 ,057 1,526 ,128 ,958 1,044 
ATTENDEDEL
ITEUNIVERSI
TY 
-12,663 5,705 -,088 -
2,220 
,027 ,850 1,177 
MBA -3,744 8,834 -,025 -,424 ,672 ,385 2,598 
MSMasterofSci
ence 
15,168 9,180 ,071 1,652 ,099 ,720 1,389 
PhD -3,866 7,075 -,024 -,546 ,585 ,671 1,490 
BUSINESSAN
DECONOMIC
S 
-6,574 8,583 -,047 -,766 ,444 ,351 2,852 
SCIENCE -5,815 6,423 -,042 -,905 ,366 ,633 1,579 
LAW 6,892 8,882 ,034 ,776 ,438 ,707 1,414 
HUMANISTIC
ANDSOCIALS
CIENCES 
-13,220 17,550 -,029 -,753 ,452 ,929 1,077 
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TENUREmonth
s 
,003 ,024 ,005 ,130 ,897 ,847 1,181 
BOARDSEATS
HELD 
-,082 ,319 -,010 -,256 ,798 ,861 1,161 
CEOINOTHER
COMPANY 
-11,272 6,879 -,064 -
1,639 
,102 ,871 1,149 
POLITICALOC
CUPATIONEX
PERIENCE 
5,091 6,877 ,030 ,740 ,459 ,816 1,226 
UNIVERSITY
TEACHINGRE
SEARCHEXPE
RIENCE 
-19,949 8,042 -,106 -
2,481 
,013 ,728 1,374 
OTHEROCCU
PATIONSProfit 
1,848 5,503 ,013 ,336 ,737 ,847 1,181 
OTHEROCCU
PATIONSNoPr
ofit 
-12,591 5,466 -,096 -
2,304 
,022 ,766 1,305 
BOARDRELA
TIONSHIPS 
-,053 ,040 -,059 -
1,334 
,183 ,680 1,471 
HEAVYINDUS
TRY 
-65,151 8,613 -,403 -
7,565 
,000 ,470 2,126 
SERVICE -5,873 9,048 -,027 -,649 ,517 ,751 1,332 
MARKETCAPI
TALIZATION 
-,133 ,034 -,179 -
3,863 
,000 ,624 1,603 
TOTALASSET
S 
,066 ,040 ,112 1,646 ,100 ,288 3,471 
CASHFLOW 1,467 ,297 ,331 4,943 ,000 ,298 3,359 
ROAusingNetIn
come 
-,027 ,006 -,297 -
4,624 
,000 ,325 3,073 
PRICEEARNI
NGRATIO 
-,013 ,003 -,212 -
4,745 
,000 ,668 1,496 
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Noofcompanies
incorporategrou
p 
,000 ,013 -,002 -,038 ,969 ,765 1,307 
 
Table 8. Coefficients 
 
In this first model there are four significant variables ( ρ-value < 0.05). These 
significant variables are: Asiatic, attended elite university, university teaching or 
research experience and other occupation in no- profit organizations. There is a positive 
relationship between Asiatic ethnicity and the number of reports, standards and policies 
( β > 0).  
This means that the more are Asiatic directors the more are the numbers of documents 
transmitted outside. There is a negative relationship between élite university attended 
and the number of reports, standards and policies ( β < 0). This means that directors 
graduated at élite universities are less willing to disclose information. There is a 
negative relationship between academic experience and the number of reports, standards 
and policies ( β < 0). This means that directors with academic experience as teachers 
or/and researchers are less likely to disclose information. There is a negative 
relationship between other occupations in no-profit organizations and the number of 
reports, standards and policies transmitted outside ( β > 0). This means that high number 
of occupations in no-profit organization held by directors increase the amount of 
disclosure. 
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Model 2. Dependent variable: CSR Report 
 
 
 Chi-quadrato df Sig. 
Passo 1 
Passo 371,307 33 ,000 
Blocco 371,307 33 ,000 
Modello 371,307 33 ,000 
 
Table 9. Test omnibus of model coefficients 
 
 
 
Passo -2 log 
verosimiglianza 
R-quadrato di Cox e 
Snell 
R-quadrato di 
Nagelkerke 
1 420,268a ,478 ,637 
Table 10. Model summing-up 
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Modello Coefficienti 
non 
standardizzati 
Coeffi
cienti 
standar
dizzati 
t Sig. Statistiche di 
collinearità 
B Deviazi
one 
standar
d 
Errore 
Beta Toll
eran
za 
VIF 
1 
(Costante) 1,296 ,166  7,792 ,000   
GENDER -,022 ,040 -,021 -,554 ,580 ,863 1,159 
AGE ,004 ,002 ,072 1,789 ,074 ,785 1,274 
BLACK ,064 ,073 ,033 ,871 ,384 ,885 1,130 
ASIATIC ,038 ,060 ,024 ,629 ,530 ,896 1,116 
HISPANIC -,051 ,096 -,019 -,534 ,594 ,950 1,052 
AFRICAN ,103 ,223 ,017 ,461 ,645 ,913 1,095 
ARAB ,110 ,189 ,021 ,580 ,562 ,958 1,044 
ATTENDEDELITEUNIVERSITY -,052 ,035 -,057 -1,481 ,139 ,850 1,177 
MBA -,010 ,054 -,010 -,183 ,855 ,385 2,598 
MSMasterofScience -,007 ,056 -,005 -,119 ,906 ,720 1,389 
PhD ,019 ,043 ,019 ,440 ,660 ,671 1,490 
BUSINESSANDECONOMICS -,056 ,052 -,064 -1,061 ,289 ,351 2,852 
SCIENCE ,002 ,039 ,002 ,039 ,969 ,633 1,579 
LAW ,022 ,054 ,017 ,409 ,683 ,707 1,414 
HUMANISTCANDSOCIALSCIENCES ,131 ,107 ,045 1,226 ,221 ,929 1,077 
TENUREmonths ,000 ,000 -,075 -1,951 ,052 ,847 1,181 
BOARDSEATSHELD ,000 ,002 ,008 ,204 ,838 ,861 1,161 
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CEOINOTHERCOMPANY -,018 ,042 -,016 -,429 ,668 ,871 1,149 
POLITICALOCCUPATIONEXPERIEN
CE 
-,033 ,042 -,030 -,774 ,439 ,816 1,226 
UNIVERSITYTEACHINGRESEARCH
EXPERIENCE 
,006 ,049 ,005 ,113 ,910 ,728 1,374 
OTHEROCCUPATIONSProfit -,020 ,034 -,023 -,588 ,557 ,847 1,181 
OTHEROCCUPATIONSNoProfit -,020 ,033 -,024 -,586 ,558 ,766 1,305 
BOARDRELATIONSHIPS 
-
9,382
E-
005 
,000 -,017 -,388 ,698 ,680 1,471 
HEAVYINDUSTRY -,287 ,053 -,282 -5,449 ,000 ,470 2,126 
SERVICE ,095 ,055 ,070 1,711 ,088 ,751 1,332 
MARKETCAPITALIZATION ,000 ,000 -,073 -1,632 ,103 ,624 1,603 
TOTALASSETS ,000 ,000 -,095 -1,431 ,153 ,288 3,471 
CASHFLOW ,013 ,002 ,475 7,301 ,000 ,298 3,359 
ROAusingNetIncome 
,000 ,000 -,663 -
10,654 
,000 ,325 3,073 
PRICEEARNINGRATIO ,000 ,000 -,373 -8,602 ,000 ,668 1,496 
Noofcompaniesincorporategroup ,000 ,000 -,160 -3,941 ,000 ,765 1,307 
 
Table 11. Coefficients 
  
 
For this variable we used a linear regression logit.  
In this  model there are no significant variables ( ρ-value < 0.05). 
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Model 3. Dependent variable: Community 
 
 
 
Modello R R-quadrato R-quadrato 
corretto 
Deviazione 
standard Errore 
della stima 
Durbin-Watson 
1 ,552a ,305 ,265 4,2408 ,325 
 
Table 12. Model summing-up 
 
 
Modello Somma dei 
quadrati 
df Media dei 
quadrati 
F Sig. 
1 
Regressione 4250,006 31 137,097 7,623 ,000b 
Residuo 9693,661 539 17,985   
Totale 13943,667 570    
 
Table 13. Anova 
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Modello Coefficienti 
non 
standardizzati 
Coeffi
cienti 
standa
rdizzat
i 
t Sig. Statistiche di 
collinearità 
B Devi
azion
e 
stand
ard 
Error
e 
Beta Tolle
ranz
a 
VIF 
1 
(Costante) 14,291 1,915  7,462 ,000   
GENDER -,145 ,459 -,012 -,315 ,753 ,863 1,159 
AGE -,035 ,026 -,054 -1,337 ,182 ,785 1,274 
BLACK ,475 ,846 ,021 ,562 ,574 ,885 1,130 
ASIATIC -1,923 ,696 -,105 -2,763 ,006 ,896 1,116 
HISPANIC -1,335 1,103 -,045 -1,210 ,227 ,950 1,052 
AFRICAN ,366 2,569 ,005 ,143 ,887 ,913 1,095 
ARAB -,086 2,174 -,001 -,039 ,969 ,958 1,044 
ATTENDEDELITEUNIVERSITY -,692 ,401 -,067 -1,725 ,085 ,850 1,177 
MBA -,557 ,621 -,052 -,896 ,371 ,385 2,598 
MSMasterofScience -,259 ,646 -,017 -,400 ,689 ,720 1,389 
PhD ,506 ,498 ,045 1,017 ,310 ,671 1,490 
BUSINESSANDECONOMICS -,230 ,604 -,023 -,380 ,704 ,351 2,852 
SCIENCE -,631 ,452 -,063 -1,396 ,163 ,633 1,579 
LAW ,112 ,625 ,008 ,180 ,857 ,707 1,414 
HUMANISTCANDSOCIALSCIENCES -1,225 1,235 -,037 -,992 ,322 ,929 1,077 
TENUREmonths -,001 ,002 -,025 -,641 ,522 ,847 1,181 
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BOARDSEATSHELD -,020 ,022 -,034 -,883 ,378 ,861 1,161 
CEOINOTHERCOMPANY -,083 ,484 -,007 -,171 ,864 ,871 1,149 
POLITICALOCCUPATIONEXPERIEN
CE 
1,352 ,484 ,111 2,795 ,005 ,816 1,226 
UNIVERSITYTEACHINGRESEARCH
EXPERIENCE 
-,443 ,566 -,033 -,783 ,434 ,728 1,374 
OTHEROCCUPATIONSProfit ,379 ,387 ,038 ,979 ,328 ,847 1,181 
OTHEROCCUPATIONSNoProfit -,483 ,385 -,052 -1,255 ,210 ,766 1,305 
BOARDRELATIONSHIPS ,003 ,003 ,042 ,961 ,337 ,680 1,471 
HEAVYINDUSTRY -5,883 ,606 -,508 -9,711 ,000 ,470 2,126 
SERVICE ,406 ,637 ,026 ,638 ,524 ,751 1,332 
MARKETCAPITALIZATION -,007 ,002 -,140 -3,078 ,002 ,624 1,603 
TOTALASSETS ,003 ,003 ,079 1,182 ,238 ,288 3,471 
CASHFLOW ,087 ,021 ,274 4,170 ,000 ,298 3,359 
ROAusingNetIncome -,002 ,000 -,330 -5,241 ,000 ,325 3,073 
PRICEEARNINGRATIO -,001 ,000 -,335 -7,633 ,000 ,668 1,496 
Noofcompaniesincorporategroup ,001 ,001 ,043 1,043 ,297 ,765 1,307 
 
Table 14. Coefficients 
 
In this model there are two significant variables ( ρ-value < 0.05). These variables are: 
Asiatic and political occupation experience. The relationship between Asiatic ethnicity 
and community item is negative ( β < 0). This means that the more Asiatic directors 
within the boardroom, the less paragraphs related to community issues. There is a 
positive relationship between political occupation experience and community item. This 
means that high political experience brought  inside the board by directors increase the 
disclosure about practices and achievements toward community development.  
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Model 4. Dependent variable:  Corporate Governance 
 
 
Modello R R-quadrato R-quadrato 
corretto 
Deviazione 
standard Errore 
della stima 
Durbin-Watson 
1 ,361a ,131 ,081 11,3998 ,330 
 
Table 15. Model summing- up 
 
Modello Somma dei 
quadrati 
df Media dei 
quadrati 
F Sig. 
1 
Regressione 10519,047 31 339,324 2,611 ,000b 
Residuo 70046,473 539 129,956   
Totale 80565,520 570    
 
Table 16. Anova 
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Modello Coefficienti non 
standardizzati 
Coeffici
enti 
standard
izzati 
t Sig. Statistiche di 
collinearità 
B Deviazi
one 
standard 
Errore 
Beta Tolle
ranza 
VIF 
1 
(Costante) 5,079 5,148  ,987 ,324   
GENDER ,654 1,235 ,023 ,530 ,596 ,863 1,159 
AGE -,026 ,070 -,017 -,378 ,706 ,785 1,274 
BLACK 2,910 2,273 ,055 1,280 ,201 ,885 1,130 
ASIATIC -2,329 1,871 -,053 -1,245 ,214 ,896 1,116 
HISPANIC 5,318 2,965 ,074 1,794 ,073 ,950 1,052 
AFRICAN 3,473 6,906 ,021 ,503 ,615 ,913 1,095 
ARAB -12,722 5,845 -,089 -2,177 ,030 ,958 1,044 
ATTENDEDELITEUNIVERSITY ,962 1,079 ,039 ,892 ,373 ,850 1,177 
MBA 1,292 1,671 ,050 ,773 ,440 ,385 2,598 
MSMasterofScience -,777 1,736 -,021 -,447 ,655 ,720 1,389 
PhD 1,180 1,338 ,043 ,882 ,378 ,671 1,490 
BUSINESSANDECONOMICS ,158 1,623 ,007 ,098 ,922 ,351 2,852 
SCIENCE ,956 1,215 ,040 ,787 ,432 ,633 1,579 
LAW ,635 1,680 ,018 ,378 ,706 ,707 1,414 
HUMANISTCANDSOCIALSCIENC
ES 
-2,319 3,319 -,029 -,699 ,485 ,929 1,077 
TENUREmonths -,005 ,005 -,043 -,985 ,325 ,847 1,181 
BOARDSEATSHELD -,080 ,060 -,058 -1,329 ,184 ,861 1,161 
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CEOINOTHERCOMPANY ,586 1,301 ,019 ,450 ,653 ,871 1,149 
POLITICALOCCUPATIONEXPERI
ENCE 
-3,128 1,301 -,107 -2,405 ,016 ,816 1,226 
UNIVERSITYTEACHINGRESEAR
CHEXPERIENCE 
,548 1,521 ,017 ,360 ,719 ,728 1,374 
OTHEROCCUPATIONSProfit 3,549 1,041 ,149 3,410 ,001 ,847 1,181 
OTHEROCCUPATIONSNoProfit ,841 1,034 ,037 ,813 ,416 ,766 1,305 
BOARDRELATIONSHIPS ,002 ,007 ,011 ,218 ,827 ,680 1,471 
HEAVYINDUSTRY 1,670 1,629 ,060 1,025 ,306 ,470 2,126 
SERVICE 1,101 1,711 ,030 ,643 ,520 ,751 1,332 
MARKETCAPITALIZATION ,002 ,007 ,017 ,327 ,744 ,624 1,603 
TOTALASSETS ,032 ,008 ,322 4,298 ,000 ,288 3,471 
CASHFLOW -,181 ,056 -,237 -3,224 ,001 ,298 3,359 
ROAusingNetIncome ,002 ,001 ,137 1,948 ,052 ,325 3,073 
PRICEEARNINGRATIO ,001 ,001 ,107 2,171 ,030 ,668 1,496 
Noofcompaniesincorporategroup ,012 ,002 ,231 5,036 ,000 ,765 1,307 
 
Table 17. Coefficients 
 
In this model there are three significant variables: Arab ethnicity, political occupation 
experience and other occupation in for- profit organizations ( ρ-value < 0.05). There is a 
negative relationship between Arab ethnicity and the number of paragraphs addressed to 
corporate governance items ( β < 0) . This means that if the number of Arab directors 
increases, the number of paragraphs related to corporate governance decreases.  
There is a negative relationship between political occupation experience and the number 
of paragraphs related to corporate governance  ( β < 0). This means that the more 
directors with political experience, the less number of information concerning corporate 
governance are yielded.  There is a positive relationship between occupation in for- 
profit organizations and the number of paragraphs related to corporate governance 
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issues ( β > 0). This means that if directors’ occupations in for-profit organizations 
increase, it follows that the number of corporate governance related paragraphs 
increases as well.   
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Model  5. Dependent variable: Diversity 
 
 
Modello R R-quadrato R-quadrato 
corretto 
Deviazione 
standard Errore 
della stima 
Durbin-Watson 
1 ,447a ,199 ,153 1,1797 ,284 
 
Table 18. Model summing-up 
 
 
Modello Somma dei 
quadrati 
df Media dei 
quadrati 
F Sig. 
1 
Regressione 186,916 31 6,030 4,332 ,000b 
Residuo 750,141 539 1,392   
Totale 937,058 570    
 
Table 19. Anova 
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Modello Coefficienti 
non 
standardizzati 
Coeffi
cienti 
standa
rdizzat
i 
t Sig. Statistiche di 
collinearità 
B Devi
azion
e 
stand
ard 
Error
e 
Beta Toll
eran
za 
VIF 
1 
(Costante) 3,072 ,533  5,765 ,000   
GENDER ,054 ,128 ,018 ,423 ,673 ,863 1,159 
AGE -,011 ,007 -,069 -1,582 ,114 ,785 1,274 
BLACK ,017 ,235 ,003 ,071 ,944 ,885 1,130 
ASIATIC -,665 ,194 -,140 -3,435 ,001 ,896 1,116 
HISPANIC -,400 ,307 -,052 -1,304 ,193 ,950 1,052 
AFRICAN ,500 ,715 ,028 ,699 ,485 ,913 1,095 
ARAB ,149 ,605 ,010 ,247 ,805 ,958 1,044 
ATTENDEDELITEUNIVERSITY -,004 ,112 -,001 -,036 ,972 ,850 1,177 
MBA ,179 ,173 ,064 1,036 ,301 ,385 2,598 
MSMasterofScience ,171 ,180 ,043 ,954 ,341 ,720 1,389 
PhD ,295 ,138 ,100 2,128 ,034 ,671 1,490 
BUSINESSANDECONOMICS -,238 ,168 -,092 -1,418 ,157 ,351 2,852 
SCIENCE -,002 ,126 -,001 -,013 ,989 ,633 1,579 
LAW ,178 ,174 ,047 1,025 ,306 ,707 1,414 
HUMANISTCANDSOCIALSCIENCES -,073 ,343 -,009 -,213 ,831 ,929 1,077 
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TENUREmonths 
-
3,817E-
005 
,000 -,003 -,080 ,936 ,847 1,181 
BOARDSEATSHELD -,004 ,006 -,028 -,684 ,495 ,861 1,161 
CEOINOTHERCOMPANY ,026 ,135 ,008 ,194 ,846 ,871 1,149 
POLITICALOCCUPATIONEXPERIEN
CE 
,073 ,135 ,023 ,542 ,588 ,816 1,226 
UNIVERSITYTEACHINGRESEARCH
EXPERIENCE 
-,275 ,157 -,079 -1,748 ,081 ,728 1,374 
OTHEROCCUPATIONSProfit ,117 ,108 ,045 1,084 ,279 ,847 1,181 
OTHEROCCUPATIONSNoProfit -,121 ,107 -,050 -1,130 ,259 ,766 1,305 
BOARDRELATIONSHIPS ,002 ,001 ,110 2,359 ,019 ,680 1,471 
HEAVYINDUSTRY -1,318 ,169 -,439 -7,822 ,000 ,470 2,126 
SERVICE -,147 ,177 -,037 -,831 ,406 ,751 1,332 
MARKETCAPITALIZATION -,002 ,001 -,129 -2,640 ,009 ,624 1,603 
TOTALASSETS ,001 ,001 ,082 1,137 ,256 ,288 3,471 
CASHFLOW -,011 ,006 -,134 -1,891 ,059 ,298 3,359 
ROAusingNetIncome ,000 ,000 -,132 -1,951 ,052 ,325 3,073 
PRICEEARNINGRATIO ,000 ,000 -,298 -6,321 ,000 ,668 1,496 
Noofcompaniesincorporategroup ,000 ,000 -,072 -1,632 ,103 ,765 1,307 
 
Table 20. Coefficients 
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There are three significant variables in this model ( ρ-value < 0.05). These variable are: 
Asiatic ethnicity, PhD and board relationships. The relationship between Asiatic 
ethnicity and the number of paragraphs addressed to diversity issues is negative ( β < 0). 
This means that if the number of Asiatic directors within the board increases, in the 
same way the number of diversity related paragraphs goes. There is a positive 
relationship between a PhD and the number of paragraphs addressed to diversity 
concerns ( β >0). This mean that  the more directors graduated with a PhD, the more 
disclosure about diversity issues.  There is a positive relationship between board 
relationships of each director and the number of paragraphs regarding diversity item ( β 
> 0).  This means that increasing board relationships of each director lead to higher 
amount of information related to diversity concerns.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
84 
 
Model 6. Dependent variable: Employee 
 
 
 
 
Modello R R-quadrato R-quadrato 
corretto 
Deviazione 
standard Errore 
della stima 
Durbin-Watson 
1 ,455a ,207 ,161 5,0523 ,291 
 
Table 21. Model summing-up 
 
Modello Somma dei 
quadrati 
df Media dei 
quadrati 
F Sig. 
1 
Regressione 3585,948 31 115,676 4,532 ,000b 
Residuo 13758,139 539 25,525   
Totale 17344,088 570    
 
Table 22. Anova 
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Modello Coefficienti 
non 
standardizzati 
Coeffi
cienti 
standa
rdizzat
i 
t Sig. Statistiche di 
collinearità 
B Deviaz
ione 
standa
rd 
Errore 
Beta Toller
anza 
VIF 
1 
(Costante) 3,659 2,282  1,604 ,109   
GENDER -,472 ,547 -,036 -,863 ,389 ,863 1,159 
AGE ,025 ,031 ,035 ,804 ,422 ,785 1,274 
BLACK -1,093 1,007 -,044 -1,085 ,278 ,885 1,130 
ASIATIC -1,642 ,829 -,080 -1,980 ,048 ,896 1,116 
HISPANIC -1,289 1,314 -,039 -,981 ,327 ,950 1,052 
AFRICAN -2,576 3,061 -,034 -,842 ,400 ,913 1,095 
ARAB ,447 2,590 ,007 ,172 ,863 ,958 1,044 
ATTENDEDELITEUNIVERSITY -,149 ,478 -,013 -,312 ,755 ,850 1,177 
MBA -1,183 ,740 -,099 -1,598 ,111 ,385 2,598 
MSMasterofScience ,383 ,769 ,023 ,498 ,619 ,720 1,389 
PhD ,042 ,593 ,003 ,071 ,944 ,671 1,490 
BUSINESSANDECONOMICS ,555 ,719 ,050 ,771 ,441 ,351 2,852 
SCIENCE -,194 ,538 -,017 -,361 ,718 ,633 1,579 
LAW ,274 ,744 ,017 ,368 ,713 ,707 1,414 
HUMANISTCANDSOCIALSCIENC
ES 
-1,089 1,471 -,029 -,740 ,460 ,929 1,077 
TENUREmonths ,001 ,002 ,020 ,477 ,634 ,847 1,181 
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BOARDSEATSHELD -,042 ,027 -,065 -1,582 ,114 ,861 1,161 
CEOINOTHERCOMPANY -,033 ,577 -,002 -,056 ,955 ,871 1,149 
POLITICALOCCUPATIONEXPERI
ENCE 
,790 ,576 ,058 1,370 ,171 ,816 1,226 
UNIVERSITYTEACHINGRESEAR
CHEXPERIENCE 
,156 ,674 ,010 ,232 ,817 ,728 1,374 
OTHEROCCUPATIONSProfit ,272 ,461 ,025 ,591 ,555 ,847 1,181 
OTHEROCCUPATIONSNoProfit -,996 ,458 -,095 -2,174 ,030 ,766 1,305 
BOARDRELATIONSHIPS ,003 ,003 ,035 ,757 ,449 ,680 1,471 
HEAVYINDUSTRY ,171 ,722 ,013 ,237 ,813 ,470 2,126 
SERVICE ,148 ,758 ,009 ,196 ,845 ,751 1,332 
MARKETCAPITALIZATION ,021 ,003 ,352 7,247 ,000 ,624 1,603 
TOTALASSETS -,015 ,003 -,320 -4,484 ,000 ,288 3,471 
CASHFLOW ,146 ,025 ,413 5,869 ,000 ,298 3,359 
ROAusingNetIncome -,003 ,000 -,368 -5,467 ,000 ,325 3,073 
PRICEEARNINGRATIO ,000 ,000 -,096 -2,054 ,040 ,668 1,496 
Noofcompaniesincorporategroup -,001 ,001 -,048 -1,084 ,279 ,765 1,307 
 
Table 23. Coefficients 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
87 
 
There are two significant variables: Asiatic ethnicity and occupations in no-profit 
organizations ( ρ-value < 0.05). Both Asiatic ethnicity and occupations in no-profit 
organizations affect negatively ( β < 0) the number of paragraphs related to employee 
treatment. This means that if the number of Asiatic directors increases, the number of 
paragraphs related to employee treatment decreases. Moreover, if directors’ occupations 
in no-profit organizations increases, the number of paragraphs addressing employee 
issues declines. 
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Model 7. Dependent variable: Environment 
 
 
Modello R R-quadrato R-quadrato 
corretto 
Deviazione 
standard Errore 
della stima 
Durbin-Watson 
1 ,517a ,267 ,225 4,9230 ,304 
 
Table 24. Model summing-up 
 
Modello Somma dei 
quadrati 
df Media dei 
quadrati 
F Sig. 
1 
Regressione 4760,470 31 153,564 6,336 ,000b 
Residuo 13063,309 539 24,236   
Totale 17823,779 570    
 
Table 25. Anova 
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Modello Coefficienti non 
standardizzati 
Coef
ficie
nti 
stand
ardiz
zati 
t Sig. Statistiche di 
collinearità 
B Deviaz
ione 
standar
d 
Errore 
Beta Tolle
ranz
a 
VIF 
1 
(Costante) 6,981 2,223  3,140 ,002   
GENDER -,067 ,533 -,005 -,126 ,899 ,863 1,159 
AGE ,019 ,030 ,027 ,638 ,524 ,785 1,274 
BLACK -,689 ,982 -,028 -,702 ,483 ,885 1,130 
ASIATIC -2,986 ,808 -,144 -3,696 ,000 ,896 1,116 
HISPANIC -,545 1,280 -,016 -,426 ,671 ,950 1,052 
AFRICAN -3,246 2,982 -,042 -1,088 ,277 ,913 1,095 
ARAB ,662 2,524 ,010 ,262 ,793 ,958 1,044 
ATTENDEDELITEUNIVERSITY -,105 ,466 -,009 -,226 ,821 ,850 1,177 
MBA -1,085 ,721 -,089 -1,504 ,133 ,385 2,598 
MSMasterofScience ,059 ,750 ,003 ,079 ,937 ,720 1,389 
PhD -,153 ,578 -,012 -,264 ,792 ,671 1,490 
BUSINESSANDECONOMICS ,607 ,701 ,054 ,866 ,387 ,351 2,852 
SCIENCE -,031 ,525 -,003 -,059 ,953 ,633 1,579 
LAW ,421 ,725 ,025 ,581 ,562 ,707 1,414 
HUMANISTCANDSOCIALSCIENCES -1,390 1,433 -,037 -,970 ,333 ,929 1,077 
TENUREmonths 
8,382E-
005 
,002 ,002 ,042 ,967 ,847 1,181 
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BOARDSEATSHELD -,022 ,026 -,033 -,838 ,402 ,861 1,161 
CEOINOTHERCOMPANY ,287 ,562 ,020 ,511 ,610 ,871 1,149 
POLITICALOCCUPATIONEXPERIEN
CE 
1,210 ,562 ,088 2,154 ,032 ,816 1,226 
UNIVERSITYTEACHINGRESEARCH
EXPERIENCE 
-,355 ,657 -,023 -,541 ,589 ,728 1,374 
OTHEROCCUPATIONSProfit -,031 ,449 -,003 -,069 ,945 ,847 1,181 
OTHEROCCUPATIONSNoProfit -,190 ,446 -,018 -,426 ,671 ,766 1,305 
BOARDRELATIONSHIPS ,002 ,003 ,032 ,721 ,471 ,680 1,471 
HEAVYINDUSTRY -2,031 ,703 -,155 -2,887 ,004 ,470 2,126 
SERVICE ,313 ,739 ,018 ,424 ,672 ,751 1,332 
MARKETCAPITALIZATION ,012 ,003 ,199 4,272 ,000 ,624 1,603 
TOTALASSETS -,004 ,003 -,078 -1,134 ,257 ,288 3,471 
CASHFLOW ,121 ,024 ,338 5,002 ,000 ,298 3,359 
ROAusingNetIncome -,003 ,000 -,402 -6,214 ,000 ,325 3,073 
PRICEEARNINGRATIO -,001 ,000 -,255 -5,665 ,000 ,668 1,496 
Noofcompaniesincorporategroup ,001 ,001 ,050 1,179 ,239 ,765 1,307 
 
Table 26. Coefficients 
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There are two significant variables ( ρ-value < 0.05): Asiatic ethnicity and political 
occupation experience. Asiatic ethnicity influences negatively the number of paragraphs 
related to environmental issues ( β < 0). This means that if the number of Asiatic 
directors increases, the amount of information related to environmental safeguard 
activities and achievements decreases. Conversely, there is a positive relationship 
between political occupation experience and the number of paragraphs dedicated to 
environmental concerns ( β > 0). This means that increasing political experience 
brought within the boardroom by directors, increases the amount of environmental- 
related disclosure.  
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Model 8.  Dependent variable: Product  
 
 
Modello R R-quadrato R-quadrato 
corretto 
Deviazione 
standard Errore 
della stima 
Durbin-Watson 
1 ,382a ,146 ,097 3,2578 ,368 
 
Table 27. Model summing-up 
 
Modello Somma dei 
quadrati 
df Media dei 
quadrati 
F Sig. 
1 
Regressione 977,956 31 31,547 2,972 ,000b 
Residuo 5720,391 539 10,613   
Totale 6698,347 570    
 
Table 28. Anova 
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Modello Coefficienti 
non 
standardizzati 
Coeffi
cienti 
standa
rdizzat
i 
t Sig. Statistiche di 
collinearità 
B Deviaz
ione 
standa
rd 
Errore 
Beta Toller
anza 
VIF 
1 
(Costante) 3,969 1,471  2,698 ,007   
GENDER -,224 ,353 -,027 -,634 ,526 ,863 1,159 
AGE -,018 ,020 -,040 -,883 ,377 ,785 1,274 
BLACK -,031 ,650 -,002 -,047 ,962 ,885 1,130 
ASIATIC -1,269 ,535 -,100 -2,374 ,018 ,896 1,116 
HISPANIC -,697 ,847 -,034 -,823 ,411 ,950 1,052 
AFRICAN -,957 1,974 -,020 -,485 ,628 ,913 1,095 
ARAB -2,669 1,670 -,065 -1,598 ,111 ,958 1,044 
ATTENDEDELITEUNIVERSITY -,014 ,308 -,002 -,046 ,963 ,850 1,177 
MBA ,355 ,477 ,048 ,743 ,458 ,385 2,598 
MSMasterofScience ,111 ,496 ,010 ,223 ,824 ,720 1,389 
PhD ,383 ,382 ,049 1,001 ,317 ,671 1,490 
BUSINESSANDECONOMICS -,193 ,464 -,028 -,415 ,678 ,351 2,852 
SCIENCE ,241 ,347 ,035 ,694 ,488 ,633 1,579 
LAW ,775 ,480 ,076 1,614 ,107 ,707 1,414 
HUMANISTCANDSOCIALSCIENCE
S 
-1,137 ,948 -,050 -1,199 ,231 ,929 1,077 
TENUREmonths ,002 ,001 ,075 1,743 ,082 ,847 1,181 
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BOARDSEATSHELD -,029 ,017 -,073 -1,708 ,088 ,861 1,161 
CEOINOTHERCOMPANY -,478 ,372 -,055 -1,286 ,199 ,871 1,149 
POLITICALOCCUPATIONEXPERIE
NCE 
,114 ,372 ,014 ,307 ,759 ,816 1,226 
UNIVERSITYTEACHINGRESEARC
HEXPERIENCE 
-,217 ,435 -,023 -,498 ,618 ,728 1,374 
OTHEROCCUPATIONSProfit ,080 ,297 ,012 ,268 ,789 ,847 1,181 
OTHEROCCUPATIONSNoProfit -,529 ,295 -,081 -1,790 ,074 ,766 1,305 
BOARDRELATIONSHIPS ,001 ,002 ,027 ,560 ,576 ,680 1,471 
HEAVYINDUSTRY ,259 ,465 ,032 ,556 ,578 ,470 2,126 
SERVICE -,202 ,489 -,019 -,414 ,679 ,751 1,332 
MARKETCAPITALIZATION -,004 ,002 -,095 -1,895 ,059 ,624 1,603 
TOTALASSETS -,003 ,002 -,113 -1,530 ,127 ,288 3,471 
CASHFLOW -,007 ,016 -,031 -,432 ,666 ,298 3,359 
ROAusingNetIncome ,000 ,000 -,103 -1,475 ,141 ,325 3,073 
PRICEEARNINGRATIO ,000 ,000 -,067 -1,381 ,168 ,668 1,496 
Noofcompaniesincorporategroup 
 
,004 ,001 ,233 5,130 ,000 ,765 1,307 
 
Table 29. Coefficients 
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Conclusion 
Recent corporate collapses ( e.g Enron and WorldCom) have raised concerns about 
corporate irresponsibility behaviors and the need to take into account social and 
environmental impacts of their activities ( Arvidsson, 2010; Glavas and Kelley, 2014).  
The public opinion has lost confidence in organizational stewardship. To fill this lack of 
trust and to restore legitimacy and a positive reputation,  companies have increased their 
Corporate Social Responsibility commitment. However, their efforts are vain if don’t 
adequately communicated outside. Disclosure about practices, policies and 
achievements is a crucial tool of Corporate Social Responsibility engagement. Despite 
its salience in order to gain legitimacy, the body of literature about this issue is still 
limited and it have been underlined a lack of standards and frameworks that can  ensure 
validity and objective evaluation of information related to Corporate Social 
Responsibility performances  and allows comparisons. The Global Reporting Initiative 
has paved the way toward a standardization of  reporting contents, but we are far from a 
widespread application of the framework provided. We want to shed light on this 
controversial topic picking out drivers of disclosure quality. Actually, our sample of 
companies includes the top global corporations in terms of communication. 
In particular, our analysis investigated how Corporate Social Responsibility disclosure 
is affected by individual characteristics of directors.  We found no significant drivers of 
the choice of providing a Corporate Social Responsibility report. However, we 
highlighted that socio demographic characteristics of directors affect contents of 
disclosure. Our research project contributes to the literature underlying that ethnical 
composition of the board can impact on items object of communication. This is in line 
with the literature that argued for an influence of cognitive base and values of 
individuals among decision making process ( Hambrick and Mason, 1984). In addition,  
human capital ( Johnson et al.,2012) brought within the boardroom by each director is 
another source of differences between organizational disclosure contents. As “ human 
capital” we refers both to political experiences and to academic expertise as teachers or 
researchers. The amount of ties to other directors in other boards, as well as other 
occupations held by directors both in profit and in no-profit organizations and the 
experience as CEO can additionally have effects on disclosure contents. Despite the 
growing body of researchers about influences of women on Corporate Social 
Responsibility issues, we found no significant relationships between gender and 
disclosure.  
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Several limits of the research should be noticed. First of all, we did not used ownership 
structure and the country of organizational headquarter as control variables. Literature 
have stressed  how economic, political, cultural and institutional contexts ( Tang et 
al.,2015; Lybaert,2011; Schmeltz, 2014; Amaladoss et al., 2013) and the nature of 
ownership ( Lybaert,2011; Ghazali, 2007; Gamerschlag et al.,2011; Ntim and 
Soobaroyen, 2013) can affect disclosure in both the amount of information transmitted 
and contents. Moreover, even if we found out that several of these corporations are 
included in Dow Jones Sustainability Index, we didn’t look for Corporate Social 
Responsibility performance indicators to discover if formal disclosure in an effective 
commitment. Finally, we collected data from database and corporate websites without 
doing in depth interviews or questionnaires.  
Future research should find links between objectives and practices communicated and 
effective socially responsible behavior. In addition, future research should investigate 
how the decision making process about voluntary disclosure and especially about 
Corporate Social Responsibility issues occurs and who, within a company, in facts, 
holds the responsibility of Corporate Social Responsibility engagement and disclosure. 
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